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TORTS
Ralph Michael Stein*
During the 1986 Survey year, a number of cases of interest to
practitioners were decided by the courts of New York. There have
been several new legislative enactments which will also have a direct impact upon the practice of tort law. These enactments are
analyzed elsewhere in this Survey volume.' Following past practice, cases of the greatest significance will be highlighted, as well as
those oddities which make tort law a stage for the human comedy.

A. Introductory Comment
The medical malpractice problem continues to be viewed as a
major crisis in the provision of health services. The attendant costs
of medical malpractice litigation are viewed by many-mostly from
the doctor and hospital camp-as intolerable. Draconian measures,
always expressed as "reforms," continue to be proposed. Recent efforts by the New York State Legislature and Governor Cuomo in
securing the enactment of a series of substantive-procedural
changes may temporarily alleviate the situation. Governor Cuomo's
recent announcement that a lengthy study of malpractice problems
in New York will soon be undertaken may mean that attorneys,
health care providers and consumers will benefit from an unbiased
and unhurried examination of what has become a hyperemotional
issue.= On the other hand, we may have just one more study which
breeds estrangement rather than consensus and a commitment to

Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author is a co-author
NEGLIGENCE
(Matthew Bender 1984), and frequently lectures
of the treatise, COMPARATIVE
on medical, psychiatric, and nursing malpractice law.
1. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, supra this Survey.
2. Stories about medical malpractice litigation flood the media and these lawsuits have
been attributed as a cause to everything from defensive medicine to suicides by doctors. In
New York State, the high power media blitz campaigns by both the medical and the legal
professions have, in my view, brought fear and confusion rather than enlightenment to the
public.
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both quality health care and due regard for the problem of professional incompetence.
As the continued flow of verdicts for plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases indicate, want of ordinary care by physicians and
institutional health care providers is neither isolated nor unusual.
At the same time, the continued ability of numerous defendants to
prevail a t trial demonstrates the continuing vitality of the common
law tradition, the ability of juries to comprehend vast amounts of
technical and scientific data, and to reach a verdict not dictated by
plaintiff's injuries alone.

B. Informed Consent
This past Survey year was marked by a dearth of noteworthy
informed consent cases. Hopefully, this is not simply an aberration
because, as noted in prior articles: there is no segment of the medical malpractice spectrum more amenable to elimination than the
cause of action for lack of informed consent.' Perhaps we are now
seeing the fruits of a trend which began gathering momentum
three or four years ago whereby physicians increasingly are recognizing and honoring the patient's right of decision by providing
relevant and comprehensible information.
C. Malpractice
the unusual case of Suria v.
Last year's Survey"iscussed
Shiffman.6 Suria involved a breast augmentation procedure on a
transsexual patient.' A series of negligent acts by several physicians were found to have resulted in painful and permanent injuries to the lai in tiff.^ During the past year, the Court of Appeals
a r m e d the jury verdict for the plaintiff but so modified the judgment as to relieve one of the defendants, Avtar S. Dhaliwal, of the
rank of joint tortfeasor and reduce him to the supporting role of
successive tortfeas~r.~

3. See, e.g., Stein, Torts, 1984 Survey of N.Y. Law, 36 SYRACUSE
L.REV595,597 (1985).
4. See id.
5. See Stein, Torts, 1985 Survey of N.Y. Law, 36 SYRACUSE
L.REV.719, 721-22 (1986)
(analysis of this case at appellate division stage).
6. 67 N.Y.2d 87, 490 N.E.2d 832, 499 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1986).
7. See id. at 91-92, 490 N.E.2d at 833, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
8. See id. at 94-95, 490 N.E.2d at 834, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 915-16.
9. See id. at 98-99, 490 N.E.2d at 837, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
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The vicarious liability of a physician who owns a clinic but
does not control the actions of a treating doctor or participate in
the treatment process of a patient-turned-plaintiff was analyzed by
New York's highest court in Hill v. St. Clare's Hospital.lo The
plaintiff in Hill sustained a work-related injury and was removed
to St. Clare's Hospital where he was, as the trial court subsequently determined, mistreated." Advised to see a company doctor, he went to a physician who was practicing in an industrial
clinic named the Benjamin A. Gilbert Medical Clinic.lz Dr. Gilbert
was hors d'combat because of his own medical problems and had
solicited a friend and colleague, Dr. Bono, to practice under his
trade name while he was recuperating.ls In fact, Dr. Gilbert "also
arranged for two secretaries and two physicians . . . formerly with
Dr. Gilbert to move" to offices which Dr. Gilbert's friend, Dr. Bono
had leased." "Dr. Gilbert never practiced at the West 44th Street
office, however, because the ailment which caused his hospitalization proved fatal."16 The new owner and operator of the Gilbert
Clinic, Dr. Bono, did not examine or treat Hill.16 Hill, however,
had used the services of the Gilbert Cliiic in the past.17 He returned to the facility that had changed location, not an uncommon
occurrence in Manhattan, but was still operating under the same
name.18 In apportioning the successive culpability of St. Clare's
Hospital and Dr. Bono, the trial court found the hospital to be
liable for thirty percent of plaintiffs harm while the non-treating
physician, Dr. Bono, was found responsible for seventy percent.lS
The key question in this case was the existence of liability on
the part of a physician who, in a proprietary sense, owns a medical
clinic open to the general public but who did not in any way participate in the treatment of a patienL20 Writing for the Court,
Judge Meyer first squarely found:

10. 67 N.Y.2d 72, 490 N.E.2d 823, 499 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1986).
11. See id. at 78, 490 N.E.2d at 825, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
12. See id.
13. See id. Dr. Gilbert apparently fully intended to resume practice under his own
name after recovering. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 76, 490 N.E.2d at 825, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 78, 490 N.E.2d at 826, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
20. See id. at 79, 490 N.E.2d at 827, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
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[Tlhat a physician who owns a medical clinic which is held out to
the public as offering medical services may be held vicariously liable for the malpractice of a treating doctor even though the
owner-physician neither participates in nor controls the diagnosis
made or treatment pre~cribed.~'

Judge Meyer provided a succinct discussion of institutional liability for independent physicians practicing within a hospital.22 He
noted the general rule that, absent special factors, a hospital is
generally not responsible for the acts of independent physicians
who maintain privileges at the hospital.2s
In the present case, Judge Meyer noted that Dr. Bono acknowledged ownership of the clinic and that medical reports to the
Workers' Compensation Board were signed by Bono with the forms
provided by Bono listing the clinic as the business entity.%' It is
also clear that while Dr. Bono did not participate in any way in the
mistreatment of the plaintiff, he did exercise considerable control
over both the clinic and the physician who diagnosed and treated
Hill.2sFees for clinic patients, as distinct from personal patients of
~ appears that
the other two doctors, were set by Dr. B o n ~ . "It~also
this was a "mixed" practice with private patients of the individual
doctors mingling in the waiting room with patients such as the
plaintiff who were seeking the attention of a clinic p h y ~ i c i a nOf.~~
fice hours were divided among the three doctors whose names, together with the name of the clinic, were on its do0r.5~If a patient
wished to see a particular doctor, he or she would have to make an

21. Id. a t 75, 490 N.E.2d a t 824,499 N.Y.S.2d a t 906.
22. See id.
23. See id. a t 79,490 N.E.2d a t 827,499 N.Y.S.2d a t 908. The degree of involvement by
a hospital with an independent physician is a key point. Generally, a hospital that is not
involved in the medical aspects of treating a patient will not be liable if those medical aspects of care reflect malpractice. T o the extent that a hospital recommends or endorses a
physician beyond the mere granting of privileges, liability is a distinct possibility. In the
Hill situation, the doctor who treated the plaintiff, Dr. Carranza, filled two roles within the
clinic. He shared space with others so that he could conduct his private practice and he was
subordinate to the direction of Dr. Bono for that part of the office's practice that dealt with
patients seeking the services of the clinic. Determining the role being performed is vital
because Dr. Bono could not be held accountable for Dr. Carranza's malpractice in treating
his own, private patients. See id.
24. See id. a t 81-82, 490 N.E.2d a t 828-29, 499 N.Y.S.2d a t 909-10.
25. See id.
26. See id. a t 82, 490 N.E.2d a t 829, 499 N.Y.S.2d a t 910.
27. See id. a t 81-82, 490 N.E.2d a t 828-29, 499 N.Y.S.2d a t 909-10.
28. See id. a t 82, 490 N.E.2d a t 829, 499 N.Y.S.2d a t 910.
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appointment; if no specific doctor was requested, the patient would
be seen by the physician in attendance when the patient arrived.pS
On that basis, despite some contradictory evidence, Judge
Meyer found:
[Tlhere was evidence from which the jury could find that Dr.
Bono owned the clinic and that plaintiff accepted Dr. Carranza's
services in reliance not upon Dr. Carranza's skill or competence
but upon the fact that his services, whatever in fact his relationship with the clinic, were offered by the clinic.s0
The situation in Hill v. St. Clare's Hospital merits attention
from the plaintiffs' bar at a time when the private practice of
medicine is frequently offered in the form of so-called "proprietary
clinic^."^^ While Dr. Bono's non-involvement in the diagnosis and
treatment of Hill is apparent, this case suggests the importance of
determining, in as timely a manner as possible, the respective roles
and responsibilities of all physicians working in the "clinical" setting. The Court of Appeals has demonstrated that mere non-involvement with a semi-independent contracting physician, with regard to the treatment of a plaintiff, will not relieve the owner of a
clinic from liability for malpractice.
A New York court also ruled on an action involving the state's
Good Samaritan Law. This type of complaint, brought relatively
infrequently against a physician-defendant was dismissed in Rodri. ~ ~ defendant, with
guez v. New York City Health & H o ~ p i t a l sThe
fifty-five years of medical practice, was entering his building when
the building superintendent's wife asked him to examine her ill
husband.ss Apparently, one look sufficed to apprise the defendant
of the fact that the building would soon need a new superintendent
and he told the wife that he could not help her husband whose

29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Certainly the term "clinic" is used increasingly in a nontraditional sense by lawyers
as well as by physicians. It appears that many of these clinics are staffed by doctors with
relatively slight assets yet they are not clearly employees so as to allow the almost automatic
invocation of the doctrine of respondeat superior. There is, of course, a difference between
an association of physicians sharing facilities, the true master-servent relationship, and the
slightly opaque arrangement reflected by Hill and, probably, by many similar practices
throughout the state.
32. 132 Misc. 2d 705, 505 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1986).
33. See id. at 706, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
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"sole, slim chance for survival lay in immediate hospitalizati~n."~'
The doctor then called the police to request an ambulance and
lefts6
The court noted that the actions of the veteran physician did
not constitute ordinary negligence, much less gross negligence
which is needed to offset the requirements of the Good Samaritan
This action against the physician is precisely the kind of
needless, unethical litigation which the medical profession incorrectly believes forms the mainstay of malpractice trial lawyers.
There was simply no basis for including the physician-defendant in
this lawsuit.
There is currently great concern over communicable diseases
and the issue of the legal duty of doctors and hospitals to warn
potential victims of diseases has been examined in a number of
cases. Understandably, the families of health care providers are
both concerned and at risk. In Knier v. Albany Medical Center
Hosp.,S7 Justice Hughes granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment in an action brought by the spouse and children of
a nurse who had contracted scabies from a patient.s8 The nurse's
husband and two children subsequently also contracted scabies.ss
While the plaintiffs alleged that the hospital had failed to follow its patient care procedures, Justice Hughes noted that
"[platient care procedures are not designed to protect the stafPs
family members or friends."'O Although there appeared to be some

34. See id. There is nothing in the opinion to suggest that any physician could have
rendered any meaningful medical help by remaining on the scene. See generally id.
35. See id.
36. The state's Good Samaritan Law, Public Health Law section 3000-a provides, in
relevant part:
Any person who voluntarily and without expectation of monetary compensation
renders first aid or emergency treatment a t the scene of an accident or other emergency outside a hospital, doctor's office or any other place having proper and necessary medical equipment, to a person who is unconscious, ill, or injured, shall not be
liable for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by such person or for
damages for the death of such person alleged to have occurred by reason of an act
or omission in the rendering of such emergency treatment unless it is established
that such injuries were or such death was caused by gross negligence on the part of
such person.
N.Y. PUB.HEALTHLAW3 3000-a (McKiney 1985).
37. 131 Misc. 2d 414, 500 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co. 1986).
38. See id. a t 414, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t 491.
39. See id.
40. See id. a t 415, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t 491.
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issue as to whether plaintiff Knier and the nurse were legally married, the real issue in this case was the scope of the zone-of-danger,
inherently a policy decision.'l The court refused to impose a duty
upon the hospital to warn the general public that one of its staff
members had been exposed to an infectious disease.'* It found that
such a requirement would be impractical and would unduly extend
the responsibility and liability of health care institution^.'^ For example, how would a defendant meet a duty to warn all residents
within the local metropolitan area that one of its employees had
been exposed to scabies?"
While the disposition of this case is correct, the analysis can
be drawn more narrowly. First, there ought to be recognition of
nurse Mary Ann Warner's degree of expert knowledge as to the
likelihood of an infectious disease in a patient for whom she was
caring, her ability to ascertain the actual diagnosis, and her own
duty-legal and moral-to convey information about exposure to
an infectious disease to family members and friends. Second, the
court should have examined the nature of the particular infectious
disease with a duty analysis to reflect the likelihood of cross-infection and the severity of resultant morbidity in exposed persons.
Scabies is not a common cold, but neither is it a massively lethal
disease such as Marburg Fever. An argument can be made that a
duty to warn identifiable possible victims, as opposed to everyone
living in Albany, can be made where the disease vector is potentially lethal. At the least, due care may require a showing that the
hospital attempted to convey the reality of the situation to the exposed employee.
Failure to diagnose, and especially failure to diagnose cancer,
is a leading source of plaintiff success in medical malpractice actions. In Talmatch v. Samet,'6 Justice McCafFrey dealt with a procedural matter with underlying substantive ~ignificance.'~A plaintiff sought to amend a complaint to include an action for wrongful
death based upon certain information contained in a death certifi-

41. See id. The sure clue is the reliance of the court on Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). See Kiner, 131 Misc. 2d at 415,500 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
42. See id. at 416, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
43. See id. at 415-16, 500 N.Y,S.Bd at 491-92.
44. See id. at 416, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
45. ,
Misc. 2d -, 504 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1986).
46. See id.
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cate.'? The death certificate indicated that the cause of death was
metastatic cancer from an original lung car~inorna.'~The plaintiff
for her
relied on Rosenberg v. New York University Ho~pital'~
contention that the death certificate in itself, without a physician's
statement of merits, was sufXcient to allege a cause of action.50
Justice McCafFrey refused to apply Rosenberg, and found that the
required affidavit of merits must be made by a physician and must
establish a causal connection between the alleged malpractice and
the new cause of action to be pleaded."l This information is not
contained in a certificate of death.62
Justice McCaffrey has applied the logical interpretation. The
public policy of the state is to attempt to eliminate frivolous and
poorly founded medical malpractice suits by demanding a physician's examination of the alleged merits of a potential case. When
such an examination is made, the physician asked to provide the
certificate is aware of the significance of her role. Death certificates, on the other hand, are often based on quick clinical impressions by a doctor who is no longer concerned with the care of the
patient. The death certificate, in non-suspicious cases, is often
viewed as a ritual, closeout requirement rather than a time for reflective analysis. To allow the death certificate to supplant the certificate of merits would be counterproductive.
Two actions involving the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor merit
the Appellate Division,
brief attention. In Schoch v. D~ugherty,"~
Third Department, found that a res ipsa loquitor charge to the
jury was unwarranted where the plaintiff had undergone two, separate surgical procedures on his knee.64It found that the question of
lack of due care was dependent on expert testimony as opposed to
lay analysis.55

47. See id. a t -, 504 N.Y.S.2d a t 998.
48. See id.
49. 128 Misc. 2d 90, 488 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1985).
50. See Talmatch, - Misc. 2d a t
504 N.Y.S.2d a t 998.
51. See id. a t -, 504 N.Y.S.2d a t 999.
52. See id.
53. 122 A.D.2d 467, 504 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dep't 1986).
54. See id. a t 469, 504 N.Y.S.2d a t 857.
55. See id. The court stated:
Our review of the record confirms that this is not a case in which such an inference
could have been made . . [Tlhe injury here did not occur in an area remote from
the operative site, but occurred during an intricate part of the surgical procedure
when the nerve was retracted to allow access . . . . Whether the resulting injury

-

..
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In Gravitt u. N e ~ r n a n , ~the
" Appellate Division, Second Department, found that the plaintiff had laid a proper evidentiary
.~~
foundation so as to allow invocation of res ipsa l o q ~ i t o rUnlike
~ case inthe medically complex case of Schoch v. D o ~ g h e r t y :this
volved the more simple problem of surgical equipment left inside
the patient." This case provides an excellent model for demonstrating the utilization of res ipsa loquitor in a medical malpractice setting.
An interesting medical malpractice case with first amendment
free exercise of religion dimensions was decided by the Appellate
Division, First Department. In Randolph v. City of New York,BO
plaintiffs decedent, an obese woman of forty-five, was pregnant
and a caesarean section was necessary."l A condition involving her
just-delievered baby's placenta necessitated the surgical procedure."' During the procedure, the patient began massively hemor.~~
immediate transfurhaging due to a surgical l a c e r a t i ~ nAlthough
sions were medically indicated, the patient had previously
"competently and unequivocally advised the defendant doctor
that, in view of the fact that she was a Jehovah's Witness, blood
transfusions were not to be administered to her under any
circ~mstances."~~
Despite the hemorrhaging, the treating physician honored the
patient's religious objections and attempted to use substitutes for
whole blood.66As the situation worsened, a physician secured telephonic authorization for transfusions and the process was begun

constituted a deviation from accepted medical practice is surely not a matter within
the competence of laymen to evaluate, but necessitated expert testimony to establish a prima facie case.
Id.

56. 114 A.D.2d 1000,495 N.Y.S.2d 439 (2d Dep't 1985).
57. See id. a t 1000-01,495 N.Y.S.2d a t 440.
58. 122 A.D.2d 467, 504 N.Y.S.2d 855.
59. See Gravitt, 114 A.D.2d a t 1000, 495 N.Y.S.2d a t 440.
60. 117 A.D.2d 44, 501 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1st Dep't 1986).
61. See id. a t 46-47,501 N.Y.S.2d a t 839.
62. See id. a t 47, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 839.
63. See id. If the laceration was, of itself, severe enough to cause death and if the laceration was inflicted through negligence, a cause of action might have been maintainable without reference to the blood transfusion issue. See id.
64. See id. a t 46, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 838.
65. See id. a t 47, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 839. The treating physician attempted to maintain
Mrs. Randolph's fluid volume by administering a fluid substitute. See id.
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but failed.66
Justice Ross' opinion for the majority deals extensively with
the complex issues raised by this case.67 Factual issues tried included the question of whether any defendant's negligence caused
the decedent to be placed in mortal peril.'js There was also evidence that a t the time the transfusion process was initiated, it was
too late to prevent the patient's death.Bs
The court noted the importance of upholding an individual's
right to withhold consent for medical care forbidden by the weight
of religious conviction^.^^ As there was no doubt that Mrs. Randolph was competent when she conveyed her wishes concerning
blood transfusions, it is clear "that the defendants would not have
been liable, if Dr. Foster had not undertaken to transfuse Mrs.
Randolph, because he would have been merely following her
wishes."?l The respondent raised the novel and untenable argument that medical practitioners have a duty to ignore religious
convictions and provide blood transfusions if they are aware that
the death of the patient will leave the patient's children with inadequate upp port.?^
The First Department, in reversing the verdict for the plaintiff, found that the trial court had erred in determining that a sufficient basis had been laid to connect alleged negligence in the
transfusion process with the actual cause of Mrs. Randolph's
death.7s In reality, what concerned the majority was not the usual
analytic problem of proximate cause but the underlying dilemma
of the physician who does not practice according to the appropriate degree of care because he attempts to respect the religious
wishes of a patient.?'

66. See id. at 47-48, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 839-40.
67. See id. at 47, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
68. See id. at 48-49, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 49-50, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
71. See id. at 49, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
72. See id. at 50, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 841. Acceptance of such a position would allow only
the single person to refuse medical care based on religious objections.
73. See id.
74. See generally id. at 50-51, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 841-42. Justice Ross stated:
To this writer, to require a physician to stand by helplessly, while a patient is dying,
and, when it is too late to save the patient, the doctor is instructed to proceed to
use his skills to save her, and, to then attempt to apply liability for his actions, is
just unacceptable.
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Justice Ellerin's dissent took issue with the majority's analysis
of the weight of the evidence concerning the possibility of saving
Mrs. Randolph at several stages during her critical and final illn e ~ s . ?Basing
~
his opinion on the general doctrine that reversal of a
jury verdict should be a highly limited option for an appellate
court, the dissenting justice believed that there was sufficient evidence in the record to allow a jury to find that Mrs. Randolph's
condition had not become irreversible until shortly before her
death.76
The court did not comment on the process by which a municipal attorney may authorize transfusions while a patient is insensate.77While the majority strongly reafErms New York's statutory
and decisional policy recognizing a competent adult's right to refuse lifesaving treatment, had Mrs. Randolph been saved by the
transfusions she would have emerged from her brush with death
with her deepest religious principles violated and no available cognizable redress for her injury. The opinion in Randolph pays lip
service to the right of a patient to refuse care but apparently only
insures that a competent adult who rejects blood transfusions will
not have the process imposed when helshe is suffering from a condition for which there is no medical need to transfuse. Law and
reality ought to be made congruent in this sensitive area. A competent, clearly articulated rejection of blood transfusions-or rejection of any other kind of medical care-should be respected at the
very moment when the patient is least able to r e a r m the prior
declaration.
In Cocomello v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center,?s disputed testimony over what a physician may or may not have said
to reassure a parent was the foundation of a claim of a missed appendicitis diagnosi~.?~
The Appellate Division, First Department,
found, however, that a statement made to the mother, by one of
the defendant physicians, advising her to bring her child to another doctor better qualified to treat the child, coupled with the
mother's compliance with that recommendation, failed to raise any

Id. at 52, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
75. See id. at 53-56, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 843-45 (Ellerin, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 55-57, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 845-46.
77. See id.
78. 120 A.D.2d 357, 502 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1st Dep't 1986).
79. See id.
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material fact issue as to the liability of that p h y s i ~ i a nWhile
. ~ ~ the
court found the alleged reassurance to be inconsistent with the advice to obtain assistance from another doctor, it is clear that reassuring words to a parent coupled with straight advice do not add
up to a colorable basis for a cause of action.s1
Reversing a judgment for an infant plaintiff in Kenigsberg v.
C ~ h nthe
, ~Appellate
~
Division, Second Department, dealt with the
nemesis of organized medicine's campaign against what it invaria~ ~Kenigsberg, a fifteenbly terms "the Malpractice C r i s i ~ . "In
month-old baby girl sustained severe burns.s4 A skin graft was subsequently performed by the defendant do~tor.~"'No claim of malpractice was made with respect to treatment of the burn wound
itself."8s The plaintiff sought to prevail at trial by showing that a
better result would have been obtained at a specialized burn care
fa~ility.~'
NO evidence suggested that the defendant in any way attempted to prevent or obstruct transfer of the patient to such a
facility nor was there evidence that the type of skin graft which he
performed was beyond the scope of his practice.8s
This is a prototypical "bad results" case in that the true gravamen of the plaintiff is the reality of the inequality of health care
services. Certainly some facilities have higher success rates than
others and this is especially true in extremely difficult services
such as burn care where only a handful of facilities develop the

80. See id. a t 357-58, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t 10.
81. See generally id. a t 357-58, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t 10.
82. 117 A.D.2d 652, 498 N.Y.S.2d 390 (2d Dep't 1986).
83. See id. a t 652, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t 391.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Id. a t 653,498 N.Y.S.2d a t 391. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant's liability was predicted on his refusal to facilitate the planned transfer of the child by certifying
that the care required by the child could not be obtained in the institution where the defendant practiced. See id. The court noted that because there was no basis for suggesting
that, in fact, adequate care could not be obtained a t the original treating facility, liability
could not be predicted on the defendant's refusal to give a false answer. See id. at 653-54,
498 N.Y.S.2d a t 391.
87. See id. a t 653, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t 391.
88. See id. The appellate panel noted:
Given that there was no testimony that the skin graft procedure would have been
done any differently a t Cornell, such testimony falls far short of the necessary
threshold showing for proximate cause, viz., that the conduct depriving the infant
plaintiff of a better chance of success more probably than not resulted in her injury.
Id. a t 653-54, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t 391.
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needed expertise. This reality of life cannot be reduced to an concept of liability.

D. Birth-related Negligence
Medical malpractice cases related to obstetrical and neonatal
care are often unusually difficult from a technical viewpoint. From
the plaintiffs' perspective, such actions mirror extreme emotional
responses to the loss of a pregnancy or the birth of a deformed
child. Throughout the United States, plaintiffs' counsel have been
trying to enlarge the scope of such malpractice actions and hardly
a Survey year passes without at least a few relevant cases in our
own state.
Two Appellate Division, Second Department, cases merit brief
consideration. In Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside,B9 the
court, in a memorandum opinion, reversed a finding for the plaintiff for emotional injuries caused by negligent advice which had
persuaded the plaintiff patient to obtain an abortion.g0Citing controlling law in the area of negligent infliction of emotional distress,
the majority found that "[nlo cause of action exists to recover
solely upon a claim of emotional injuries suffered by a mother as
the result of physical harm done to her child in ~tero."~'
Noting that "[tlhis case is as simple as it is tragic,"92 Justice
Gibbons penned a thoughtful dissent which argued that Martinez
is clearly distinguishable from the cases relied upon by the majorit^.^^ In this case, Mrs. Martinez was advised to obtain an abortion
because the defendant had erroneously miscalculated the quantity
of a drug she had taken during pregnan~y.~'The amount calculated by the defendant would almost certainly have resulted in a
deformed child while the actual amount ingested was unlikely to
Jushave had any significant effect on normal fetal devel~prnent.~~
tice Gibbons noted:

89. 122 A.D.2d 122, 504 N.Y.S.2d 693 (2d Dep't 1986).
90. See id. at 122-24,504 N.Y.S.2d at 693-94. This case is made more tragic by the fact
that the plaintiff had to overcome her own religious beliefs in order to undergo an abortion.
See id. at 122, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 694.
91. See id. at 122, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
92. Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
93. See id. at 122, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 694.
94. See id.
95. See id.
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Thus, it is apparent that Mrs. Martinez was not injured as a result of physical harm done to her child in utero, but, rather, was
injured upon being misinformed that her fetus was hopelessly
malformed and that an abortion was necessary . . . . Her injury
was later compounded upon learning of the appellant's tragic error after she had aborted the healthy fetus."

Justice Gibbons' analysis is persuasive. Martinez is much
more akin to the emotional distress cause of action based on a
faulty diagnosis, such as of cancer, than it is to the cases cited by
the majority where the fetus was harmed directly and the pregnant
woman suffered emotional harm.
In the delivery of a baby, obstetrical and pediatric functions
are closely entwined. Whether a pediatrician's negligence, following
an obstetrician's departure from a reasonable standard of care,
constitutes successive or joint negligence was before the Appellate
. ~ ~avoid
Division, Second Department, in Ravo v. R o g a t n i ~ k To
joint and several liability, the pediatrician claimed that his negligence was independent of the obstetrician'^.^^ The court noted:
The evidence shows . . . that after a difficult delivery involving
brain damage, which was determined by the jury to have involved
negligence on the part of the obstetrician, the infant plaintiff had
a very high bilirubin and hematocrit level, both known to indicate
conditions which cause brain damage. Harris' [the pediatrician]
negligence was the failure to act promptly with respect to the infant plaintws condition existing a t birth and for some time
thereafter which indicated that severe brain damage was
impli~ated.~~

A finding of joint and several liability was correct because there
was no testimony which would have allowed a jury to apportion
the injury.loO
It is clear that causes of action based on the inevitable emotional distress consequent to medical malpractice where the only
palpable harm to the pregnant woman is the loss of the fetus, or
deformation of the fetus, continue not to be recognized in New

96. Id.
97. 122 A.D.2d 705, 503 N.Y.S.2d 890 (2d Dep't 1986).
98. See id. at 706, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
99. Id. at 706, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 891-92.
100. See id. at 706, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
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E. Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions
As always, in negligence law in general, and medical malpractice cases in particular, a number of verdicts were set aside as excessive.lo2 The opinions sustaining or directing the reduction of
verdicts in medical malpractice cases did not provide any new
analyses during the past year.

F. Miscellaneous Malpractice Cases
In Landon by Landon v. New York Hospital,lo3 the Court of
Appeals, without opinion, affirmed the appellate division's dismissal of the plaintiffs' emotional distress claims.lo4 The plaintiffs,
whose child was deteriorating from bacterial meningitis, claimed
emotional harm from observing the child's grave condition while
also experiencing fears of contracting the disease themselves.lo6
The dissent viewed the relationship between treating physicians and the parents of an ill child as creating a duty running to
the parents to provide accurate and reasonable informati~n.'~~
"Since there exists a direct duty to the parents independent of
that owed by the physicians to the child, appellant's cause of action seeking damages for emotional harm is cognizable at law."lo7
If viewed on an independent duty basis, for which the dissent
claimed there was authority,'08 the parents should have been permitted to attempt to prove their cause of action.

101. See, e.g., Wittrock v. Maimonidies Medical Center-Maimonidies Hosp., 119 A.D.2d
748, 501 N.Y.S.2d 684 (2d Dep't 1986) (no recovery for both the emotional and physical
harm resulting from a still birth); Gastwirth v. Rosenberg, 117 A.D.2d 706,499 N.Y.S.2d 95
(2d Dep't 1986) (no recovery for emotional harm caused by malpractice resulting in in utero
death); Mc Bride v. Brookdale Hosp. Medical, 130 Misc. 2d 999,498 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct.,
Kings Co. 1986) (recovery for malpractice to mother for emotional distress distinct from
recovery for distress linked to loss of fetus).
102. See Vialva v. City of New York, 118 A.D.2d 701,499 N.Y.S.2d 977 (2d Dep't 1986)
(excessive pain and suffering award); Trocchia v. Long Island College Hosp., 122 A.D.2d 626,
503 N.Y.S.2d 651 (2d Dep't 1986) (trial court erred in finding jury verdict inadequate).
103. 65 N.Y.2d 639, 481 N.E.2d 239, 491 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1985).
104. See id. a t 640, 481 N.E.2d a t 239,491 N.Y.S.2d a t 607.
105. See id. a t 639-40,481 N.E.2d a t 239, 491 N.Y.S.2d a t 607.
106. See id. a t 640-41,481 N.E.2d a t 239-40,491 N.Y.S.2d a t 608 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
107. See id. a t 641, 481 N.E.2d a t 240, 491 N.Y.S.2d a t 608.
108. See id. a t 641-42, 481 N.E.2d a t 240-41, 491 N.Y.S.2d a t 608-09.
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Query: why are there so few reported legal malpractice cases?
Are they settled prior to trial? Before verdict? After judgment is
entered? There must be a reason why the malpractice insurance
rates of most New York attorneys, while they are in no way comparable to those of physicians, continue to climb.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, decided two legal
malpractice cases during the Survey year, neither of earthshaking
importance. In Green v. Leibowitz,'OS both fraud and legal malpractice were alleged.l1° The plaintiff essentially sought damages
for emotional distress and claimed that intentional misrepresentation by the plaintws former attorney in his handling of a disability claim constituted intentional infliction of mental distress."'
The Secord Department disagreed, finding that the plaintiff failed
to allege a prima facie cause of action for intentional infliction of
mental distress and that psychic injury could not be claimed in
legal malpractice and fraud causes of action.'le
A significant percentage of legal malpractice actions arise from
the failure of counsel to initiate litigation within the requisite statute of limitations. The question of what damages are recoverable
in such an event is fairly well settled, but questions continue to
arise. In Chiafi u. Wexler, Bergerman & C r u ~ e t , " ~
the court
stated the prevailing American rule that "[tlhe determination of
an award of damages requires plaintiffs to establish the injuries
suffered and their value . . . . Therefore, in a legal malpractice action, the collectibility of a hypothetical judgment against the underlying tortfeasor is a factor to be considered by the trier of
facts."lr4
Perhaps this rule, not illogical in itself, helps to explain the
dearth of legal malpractice actions. Unlike medical malpractice
suits, legal malpractice actions which are based on alleged failure
to comply with statute of limitations requirements result in a trialwithin-a-trial. The merits of the plaintiffs lost cause of action
must be assessed but without the discovery, witnesses and evi-

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

118 A.D.2d 756, 500 N.Y.S.2d 146 (2d Dep't 1986).
See id.
See id. at 756-57, 500 N.Y.S.2d 146-47.
See id. at 758, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
116 A.D.2d 614, 497 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dep't 1986).
See id. at 615, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
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dence which would have been part of the original action. A legal
malpractice action is risky because few negligence or contract actions begin with a plaintiffs certitude of victory. While it is doubtful that the bar benefits from this situation, individual attorneys
who have failed to file an action within the applicable statutory
period assuredly do. The courts should develop a theory of an initial presumption of minimal damages because of counsel's negligence in failing to initiate litigation. Such a development may well
act as a deterrent to such negligence. The present doctrine certainly does not.

IV. NEGLIGENCE
No major doctrinal developments in the general substantive
law of negligence emerged during the Survey year. A number of
decisions are of interest as they reflect the courts' continuing attempts to resolve the numerous, and occasionally novel, injury-producing civil disputes which occupy so much court time.
In Panzer v. Harding,l16 the Appellate Division, Second Department, a r m e d a rare jury verdict for dog owners whose animal
had bitten a child.l16 The dog in question had a clean record and
was a known friend of children."' For years, cases involving dogs
who bite little children had been decided functionally, if not doctrinally, on the basis of strict liability. Panzer has given hope for a
reversal of this trend.
Gordon v. American Museum of Natural Historylls is a rare
case in which both the appellate division and Court of Appeals decisions were reported within the same Survey year.ll* This was a
slip and fall case in which the plaintiff sustained injuries on the
front entrance steps of a museum.120 He claimed that he saw a
piece of "white, waxy paper"121 while he was in midair.122The First
Department sustained an entry of judgment against the defendant,

115. 118 A.D.2d 842, 500 N.Y.S.2d 328 (2d Dep't 1986).
116. See id. at 843, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
117. See id.
118. 67 N.Y.2d 836, 492 N.E.2d 774, 501 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1986).
119. See id. at 837, 492 N.E.2d at 774, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
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but the Court of Appeals reversed in a memorandum opinion.la8
The Court noted:
There is no evidence in the record that defendant had actual notice of the paper and the case should not have gone to the jury on
that theory. To constitute constructive notice, a defect must be
visible and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient length of
time prior to the accident to permit defendant's employees to discover and remedy it.lP4

Recalling to mind classic cases involving the pigmentation of
banana skins, the Court found that the plaintiff did not even describe the paper as dirty, thus failing to establish a minimum basis
for alleging neglect in not policing the area.136
Reaching the Court of Appeals was Strauss v. Belle Realty
Co.,la6 a case arising out of in New York's second great blackout,
the July 13, 1977 adventure in neighborliness and looting.la7 The
plaintiff-tenant had sustained personal injuries during the blackout while traversing a common area of his apartment b~ilding.''~
The appellate division dismissed the complaint and the Court of
Appeals affirmed.laSJustice Kaye, writing for the Court, found that
liability, following a cataclysmic event such as a citywide power

123. See id. a t 838,492 N.E.2d a t 775, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 647.
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. Even if the paper had been diiy, a reasonable standard of care for a museum,
attracting thousands of persons a day with its approaches besieged by vendors of every type
offering food and trinkets, cannot posaibly maintain steps clear of slips of paper. There is a
difference between the museum's setting and the indoor setting where failure to reasonably
police the premises may be the basis for a successful slip and fall judgment for the plaintiff.
See Rabiiowitz v. New York Tel. Co., 119 A.D.2d 741,501 N.Y.S 2d 152 (2d Dep't 1986). In
thii case the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a jury verdict of over
$112,000 entered for a p l a i n t s who suffered a severe neck injury when, while using a public
telephone owned by the defendant, he turned and was cut in the neck by a sharp metal
telephone cord. See id. a t 741, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 153. The court found that the judgment
could not be sustained because of the total lack of proof that any notice, actual or constructive, about the condition of the phone booth, was made to the phone company. See id. a t
742, 501 N.Y.S 2d a t 153. The issue of demonstrating not only control but awareneee of a
defect is vital in establishing a prima facie negligence case where the defendant is reeponsible for the condition of either equipment or premises visited by large numbers of unsupervised people who actually create the hazardous conditions which cause injury. In many
instances, the defendant can be shown to have had actual or constructive notice, but thii
information is rarely volunteered. Aggressive and effective discovery is essential.
126. 65 N.Y.2d 399,482 N.E.2d 34,492 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1985).
127. See id. a t 401, 482 N.E.2d a t 35,492 N.Y.S.2d a t 556.
128. See id.
129. See id. a t 405, 482 N.E.2d a t 38,492 N.Y.S.2d a t 559.
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outage, "should, as a matter of public policy, be limited by the
contractual relationship."lgOJustice Kaye seemed to be especially
concerned with the implications of recognizing tort liability in this
type of situation because of the logical likelihood that the potential
group of plaintiffs would grow to include customers of stores and
social guests.lgl
In an excellent and well-reasoned dissent, Justice Meyer found
the majority's approach to be one-sided and inadequate for the
problem presented.lg2Creatively citing Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,lgSa case creating an unrelated doctrine which
has not been accepted in New York, Justice Meyer demonstrated
that there exists extensive criteria for analyzing the duty issue
raised by Consolidated Edison's clear and gross negligence in assuring a blackout of monstrous proportions.lg4 Of equal importance, Justice Meyer rejected the protectionist stance adopted by
the majority which maintained that the public cannot afford to
have Consolidated Edison held accountable for its negligence on a
grand scale because the utility might succumb to litigation and
judgments.1s6
The responsibility of a driver who is speeding and is involved
in an accident caused by another driver crops up occasionally in
both the criminal and tort law fields. The key to securing a judgment against such a driver lies in demonstrating that he or she was
acting in concert with the injury-producing tortfeasor rather than
simply acting irresponsibly alone. In Shea v. Kelly,lS6the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a verdict against a

130. Id. a t 401, 482 N.E.2d a t 35, 492 N.Y.S.2d a t 556.
131. See id. a t 405, 482 N.E.2d a t 38, 492 N.Y.S.2d a t 559.
132. See id. (Meyers, J., dissenting).
133. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
134. See Strauss, 65 N.Y.2d a t 407-08, 482 N.E.2d a t 39-40, 492 N.Y.S.2d a t 560-61.
135. See id. a t 409,482 N.E.2d a t 41,492 N.Y.S.2d a t 562. The jurist has raised a major
ethical and policy issue in contemporary torts. Should Union Carbide be shielded from the
consequences of the Bhopal disaster, or a subsequent American toxic calamity, if it can be
shown that the corporation would fail? Does anyone really believe that tort litigation
against a major public utility might result in the lights of Broadway and the rest of New
York City going dark? If the majority's approach is valid, what principled guidelines, do
courts have to distinguish the tortfeasor whom public policy must insulate from judgments
from all those who regularly expire with or without satisfying judgments entered? Justice
MeyerP dissent merits thoughtful and respectful attention.
136. 121 A.D.2d 620, 503 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dep't 1986).
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speeding third-party driver.ls7 The court found that "[als the evidence only established that the two drivers were simultaneously
operating their vehicles at high speeds, it cannot, without more, be
found to support an inference of an intent to race."lS8 It is clearly
the plaintiffs burden to prove concert of action and plaintiffs
counsel's responsibility to thoroughly investigate the relationship,
if any, between potential defendants.lSB
Each year, the issue of negligent supervision of children arises
in one form or another. In Walden By Walden v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute,140 the defendant raised a counterclaim and requested contribution or indemnification from the parents of the injured child."' The child fell onto broken glass on the defendant's
property which adjoined land owned by the plaintiffs father."%
The Appellate Division, Third Department, reviewed recent case
law concerning negligent supervision of children and found no
cause of action or counterclaim based on negligent supervision
could survive.14s I t found that any negligence arising from the father's knowledge of a dangerous condition created by his daughter
did not give rise to a general duty independent of the family
relationship."'
While some cases are clear as to whether negligent supervision
or negligence as a reflection of a general duty is the actual basis for
a cause of action, this is an area in which vague or careless pleading will cause great problems. Counsel drafting defenses and counterclaims alleging some failure on the part of a child's parent must
be sure that they understand the distinctions that have been cre-

137. See id. a t 620, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t 650.
138. Id. a t 621, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t 650.
139. See id.
140. 116 A.D.2d 963, 498 N.Y.S.2d 289 (3d Dep't 1986).
141. See id.
142. See id. at 963, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t 290.
143. See id. a t 964-65, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t 291.
144. See id. a t 964, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t 291. The court found:
Insofar as defendant alleged that the father had dominion over or ownership of the
property on which his daughter fell and breached a general duty to care for and
maintain it, we are of a view that the counterclaim is maintainable. On the other
hand, to the extent that the negligence, defendant assigns to him, is his knowing
acquiescence in the creation of a dangerous condition by his daughter, that inactivity bespeaks not of any breach of a general duty independent of the familial relationship, but rather of the failure of the parent to properly supervise the child.

Id.
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ated by New York law and restated in Walden.
The importance of careful pleading in negligence cases was
~ ~ sole
also demonstrated by Vaill v. Oneida Dispatch C ~ r p . 'The
cause of action pled was negligen~e."~The plaintiff, without her
consent or knowledge, was the subject of a personals advertisement
in the defendant's newspaper."' The advertisement featured her
first name and correct telephone number and solicited male companionship."* Plaintiff sought damages for mental anguish as she
was harassed by persons who responded to the advertisement and
by an individual who showed up a t her door, having somehow
learned her address.149Justice Aloi, sitting in the Supreme Court,
Oneida County, held that plaintiff could not recover under existing
law and entered summmary judgment for the defendant.160
Although the problem of "Personals" advertisements is discussed below in connection with a particularly egregious case,'61 it
ought to be obvious that New York's law of negligent infliction of
mental distress, never viewed as ground breaking anywhere, should
recognize a category of psychic harm related to the placement of
spurious personal advertisements. If these advertisements are an
accepted way of soliciting personal relationships, and they clearly
are, the parties benefiting economically from these services must
be forced to deal responsibly with the absolutely foreseeable problem of spurious ads. The burden of care which would be placed on
those publications which run personal ads would be minimal and
cost effective. The harm prevented also would be great. While the
courts could wait until such an advertisement results in physical
harm, rape, or death to an innocent victim, it is preferable to see
the issue addressed sooner.

A. Damages
The issue of damages is always with us. In Klump v. Bowman,162the plaintiff was injured in a fall off a stepladder a t a "pick

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

129 Misc. 2d 477, 493 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct., Oneida Co. 1985).
id.
id.
id.
id. at 478,493 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
id. at 482, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
infra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
117 A.D.2d 857, 498 N.Y.S.2d 561 (3d Dep't 1986).

See
See
See
See
See
See
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your own" apples orchard.lBsThe trial court ordered, following a
verdict for plaintiff, a new trial unless the defendant stipulated to
an almost one hundred percent increase in damages.'" The Appellate Division, Third Department, however, found that the record
reflected permanent and disabling injuries and a new trial on damages alone was ordered.lB6
Fifteen-year-old boys are often viewed as a pain in the posterior but just how much is actual damage to a boy's posterior
worth? In Miller v. Cattabiani,lB6we learn that birdshot in the left
buttocks is not worth $150,000 to the victim and $35,000 to the
mother for loss of services.'B7 The boy's verdict was reduced to a
still respectable $100,000 while the mother had to be happy with
$l8,849.91.lB8
Appellate a d d i t ~ r s 'are
~ ~ fairly rare creatures. In Berman v.
National Council of Beth Jacob,lBOthe Appellate Division, Second
Department, increased a plaintiffs principal recovery from $30,000
to $50,000.1e1 The cause had been tried by the court and the appellate court did not feel constrained to accept the trial judge's findings.le2 In some instances, there may be a special advantage with
regard to damages in trying a case without a jury. If a plaintiffs
verdict is deemed to be insufficient, trial counsel should recognize
that the appellate court has a basis for increasing the verdict which
it would lack if a trial by jury had taken place.
B. State and Municipal Entities
Most of the cases decided during the past Survey year reflect

153. See id.
154. See id. a t 857,498 N.Y.S.2d a t 562.
155. See id. a t 858, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t 563.
156. 119 A.D.2d 864, 500 N.Y.S.2d 430 (3d Dep't 1986).
157. See id. a t 865,500 N.Y.S.2d a t 431. The dissenting justice would not have reduced
the verdict because there was evidence of permanent nerve damage and the victim was no
longer acceptable for military service. See id. a t 868, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t 433 (Mikoll, J.,
dissenting).
158. See id. a t 867, 500 N.Y.S.2d a t 432.
159. "The power of trial court is to assess damages or increase amount of an inadequate
award made by jury verdict, as condition of denial of motion for new trial, with consent of
defendant whether or not plaintiff consents to such action." BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
36
(5th ed. 1979).
160. 119 A.D.2d 787, 501 N.Y.S.2d 413 (2d Dep't 1986).
161. See id at 788, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 413.
162. See id a t 788, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 414.
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established law and call for neither notice nor comment. Some provide practice pointers and, occasionally, sharp reminders. The
most interesting cases often arise from the law enforcement area.

1. Law Enforcement
For the past several years, an increasingly intensive national
and statewide campaign to curb drunken driving has resulted in a
major increase in arrests and prosecutions for driving while intoxicated (DWI). In New York, persons arrested for DWI are generally
released after processing if a sober friend or relative is available to
accept responsibility. DWI arrests are generally nocturnal and the
offenders are not usually charged with major crimes in addition to
DWI. Most departments are only too happy to see the arrested
persons released on an appearance ticket because confinement facilities are limited.lbs
Probably most such released persons are grateful to just sleep
it off in a non-institutional bed. One person who did not was Bradley D. Kelly who, two hours after having been arrested for DWI,
killed a motorist while driving.le4 In Shea v. Town of F i ~ h k i l l , ~ ~ ~
the plaintiffs sought recovery by alleging that the town was negligent in releasing Kelly into the custody of friends.'bb Kelly had

163. Chief of Police Donald L. Singer of the Greenburgh, New York Police Department,
a recognized authority on modern police administration and a member of the New York
Bar, was interviewed in connection with the preparation of this Article. Singer stated:
Police departments today are experiencing unprecedented tort litigation. Some of
the cases arise from alleged negligence with regard to the care of people in temporary custody a t police stations. Aggravating the situation is the increase in driving
while intoxicated arrests. These subjects have rarely been arrested before, are
frightened often, and can react to close confinement with behavior that can produce
injury. I inaugurated a special driving whiie intoxicated program years before the
major campaigns began and I learned that releasing charged persons into the care of
competent, that is sober, friends or relatives, was usually the most effective way of
handling the situation and reducing the possibility of liability. I t is absolutely incumbent, however, on either the arresting officer or the desk officer, to direct the
person being released not to drive again until complete sobriety has returned, to
also give that information to the people picking the subject up, and to document
that this direction has been given.
Telephone interview with Donald L. Singer, Chief of Police, Greenburgh, N.Y. Police Department (Sept. 9, 1986).
164. Shea v. Town of Fishkill, 121 A.D.2d 375, 376, 502 N.Y.S.2d 804, 804 (2d Dep't
1986).
165. See id.
166. See id.

Heinonline - - 38 Syracuse L. Rev. 567 1987-1988

568

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 38:545

been instructed by police not to drive again that night.lB7The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed dismissal of the
cause of action and restated the rule that no special relationship
exists between a municipality and the victims of an intoxicated
driver where the police take no affirmative action to prevent the
intoxicated person from further driving.lB8
While it is impossible not to empathize with the plaintiffs in
this action, the public welfare would not be served by holding intoxicated drivers until they become sober. The majority do not attempt to drive while intoxicated and the potential tort liability of
short term incarceration, considering the number of arrests being
made for DWI, is significant.
An issue as to whether a general duty to the public exists was
also analyzed in Coyne v. State.lBSThe Appellate Division, Third
Department, found that the plaintiff could not state a cause of action in negligence and was barred by the statute of limitations
from bringing a false arrest and malicious prosecution cause of action.170 Coyne claimed that he would not have been arrested if the
arresting state police investigator had been properly conducting an
investigation of a report that unlawful dealing with a minor was
occurring.171 The court correctly found that "[tlhe case law is well
settled that, on public policy grounds, no legally cognizable cause
of action exists for negligent investigation of a crime and claimant's only avenue of relief is by way of the traditional remedies of
false arrest and malicious prosecution suits."'72 A cause of action
against the police on a general theory of negligence in conducting
investigations would undermine the entire apparatus of law enforcement and no such theory has been accepted anywhere.
Police discretion in determining adequate grounds to establish
probable cause for an arrest is a key issue in many preliminary
criminal proceedings. It is also a possible basis for civil damages
In Orndorff v. De Nooyer Chevrolet,
against a rnuni~ipality.'~~

167. See id.
168. See id. at 376, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 805 (citations omitted).
169. 120 A.D.2d 769, 501 N.Y.S.2d 505 (3d Dep't 1986).
170. See id. at 770, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
171. See id. at 769, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
172. See id. at 770, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 506 (citations omitted).
173. See Orndorff v. De Nooyer Chevrolet, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 365,503 N.Y.S.2d 444 (3d
Dep't 1986).
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Inc.,17' the Appellate Division, Third Department, sustained a jury
The
verdict in favor of the plaintiff against the Town of C01onie.l~~
plaintiff had left his car for repairs with defendant De Nooyer
Chevr01et.l~~
After receiving less than attentive responses to his repeated requests, he asked the defendant's employee Nelson what
he had to do to retrieve his car.177 "Nelson allegedly replied in a
flippant manner, '[dlo whatever you like.'
Shortly thereafter
the plaintiff entered the lot where his car was and drove it away.17s
Subsequently, Nelson reported the car as stolen but also informed
police that the "[clar may be in possession of owner; owner possibly took car and did not pay $4000 bill."lS0 On this basis, the car
was entered into the computer system as a stolen vehicle.lS1A few
days later, plaintiff was stopped by police, arrested, processed, and
held overnight in the Albany County Jai1.lS2He was charged with
the nonexistent crime of theft of what amounted to a disputed
debt, a charge dismissed in court.lSs The Third Department affirmed a judgment against the Town of Colonie for $31,250 for
both false arrest and malicious prosecution.184
The officer on patrol who stopped Orndorff had reasonable
grounds for both the stop and field investigation. The car might,
indeed, have been stolen. The information furnished by Nelson,
however, should have been available to officers in the field. To proceed to arrest the registered owner of a car, a person unlikely to
disappear if a further investigation developed, was gross
negligence.lE6

174. See id.
175. See id. a t 366, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t 445.
176. See id.
177. See id. a t 366, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t 446.
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 367, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t 446.
181. See id.
182. See id. a t 368, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t 447.
183. See id.
184. See id. It is hard to conceive of a better textbook case to establish municipal tort
liability. There was no colorable basis for the arrest of Omdorff. The report filed by Nelson
in itself should have alerted the desk sergeant or o5cer taking the report that while the car
might have been stolen, i t . possession by the owner of record would be at most a civil matter between the person reporting the alleged theft and the owner.
185. See id. a t 368-69,503N.Y.S.2d a t 447. Counsel for police departments and municipalities can appraise this case in two ways. It may be viewed as a certain indicator of how
their police department will fare a t trial under similar facts or it may suggest the need for
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The Court of Claims reviewed the rationale and validity of the
traditional "Fireman's Rule" in Santangelo v. State.lS8Several police officers asserted that the injuries they incurred while apprehending a dangerous escaped mental patient were proximately related to the state's negligent confinement of the patient.ls7 The
patient had a history of both escape and violence.188
Judge Benza dismissed the claims of the officers.1seThe state
both denied that its employees had been negligent, a question of
fact, and asserted the absence of any duty to the injured officers, a
primary issue of law.leOJudge Benza noted that the traditional rule
which precludes recovery by police officers and fire fighters for
negligence which gives rise to a call for their special services has
little explanatory and interpretive case law in New York.lS1 The
weight of case law demonstrates, however, that the "Fireman's
Rule" has been consistently followed.1e2
Although there is an exception to the "Fireman's Rule" involving a duty to warn potential victims of a known danger, Judge
Benza found that this exception does not apply to police who may
not avoid the very danger represented by the threat.le8 "It would
strain statutory interpretation to agree that a regulation or statute
seeking to warn a person of a specific danger would at the same
time mandate this individual to seek out and apprehend that very
danger to prevent injury, ostensibly to himself."194

continuing education of police as to both constitutional and tort law guidelines. The latter
approach is believed to be the right one. Few municipalities today can afford tort judgments
and prevention is better than defending avoidable, losing cases.
186. 129 Misc. 2d 898, 494 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Ct. C1. 1985).
187. See id. a t 899,494 N.Y.S.2d a t 49.
188. See id.
189. See id. a t 908, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t 55.
190. See id. a t 901, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t 51.
191. See id. a t 903-04, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t 52-53.
192. See id. a t 903, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t 52.
193. See id. a t 907, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t 55.
194. Id. The judge's interpretation of the non-applicability of the "Fireman's Rule" exception to the facts in Santangelo is compelling. The paradox created by the plaintiffs'
theory is that it would, as the judge noted, "impose on the public a duty to provide a policeman with a work environment free of potential danger." See id. Potential danger is, of
course, a t the heart of the calling of both the police and fire fighting vocations. "Public
policy is better served by the continuation of the fireman's rule in New York and, as the
injuries sustained by the claimants were a direct result of the negligence which occasioned
their presence a t the place of the occurrence, their claims are dismissed."
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In Smith u. City of Neul York,lS6the Appellate Division, Second Department, affrmed the dismissal by the trial court of an
action brought by hospital employees who had been taken hostage
by an inmate brought to the hospital for treatment.lB8The plaintiffs claimed both physical and psychic injuries.lS7 The problem
with the plaintiffs' case was that it "failed to establish the existence of a special relationship between themselves and the New
York City Department of Corrections . . . which would have protected them from the dangers posed by an escaped inmate."1ss The
major evidentiary failing is that while the plaintiffs asserted reliance on the defendant for protection, no evidence to indicate such
~ . ~ ~this
~ case was correliance was presented to the trial C O U ~ While
rectly decided, it is unclear if plaintiffs' defeat on the merits was
due to inadequate presentation of evidence or actual lack of supportive facts.200
The liability of a landlord for criminal activities committed by
third parties against tenants is a major area of housing law. A
somewhat different fact pattern was presented in Waters u. New
York City Housing A ~ t h o r i t y A
. ~junior
~ ~ high school student was
accosted outside a housing project owned and operated by the defendant.202She was forced a t knife point into a project building
through an unlocked door, taken to the roof, robbed, and repeatedly sexually abused.20s The housing authority was aware that
there was a broken door lock used as the point of entry and that
the tenants were concerned about potential incidents resulting
from the unlocked door.204
Justice Weinstein, writing for the majority, affirmed the granting of summary judgment for the housing authority.206While recognizing that landlords owe a duty to exercise some care to prevent
the criminal victimization of both tenants and visitors to buildings,

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

122 A.D.2d 133, 504 N.Y.S.2d 696 (2d Dep't 1986).
See id. at 133, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
See id.
Id. (citations omitted).
See id. at 134, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98.
See id.
116 A.D.2d 384, 501 N.Y.S.2d 385 (2d Dep't 1986).
See id. at 385, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
See id. Her assailant was neither identified nor subsequently apprehended. See id.
See id.
See id. at 385, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 385-86.
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the court found that "it is clear that a duty of care does not devolve upon the defendant New York City Housing Authority with
respect to all persons who regularly traffic the city streets and sidew a l k ~ . "The
~ ~ ~court noted that the infant victim in Waters was
not a visitor to the building and that the authority had no knowledge of the presence of a dangerous person near their premises.a07
The majority reasoned that the result of finding the existence of a
duty in this fact pattern would be to potentially establish liability
in virtually all cases where a possessor of a building failed to install
or use
New York has, of course, abandoned the traditional classification of visitors to land as the measuring stick of
The modern rule is that property must be maintained based upon a reasonable standard of care and foreseeability is relevant to determine
whether a possessor of land departed from the duty owed to virtually
Thus, the abrogation of the hoary traditional duty concept has not brought with it, nor could it, unlimited and ruinous
liability for land owners and landlords.a11
If the modern duty concept had been properly applied in Waters, the housing authority would be viewed as owing a duty of
reasonable care to all who found themselves on its premises.
Whether the authority deviated from the required standard of care
would be a jury question and it is quite possible the authority
would have prevailed.212

206. See id. a t 386-87, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 387.
207. See id. a t 387, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 387.
208. See id. a t 388, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 388. Justice Eiber, penning a dissent in which
Justice Brown concurred, identified the fatal reasoning adopted by the majority.
Contrary to the view of the majority, this case centers not on the duty of a landlord
to control the criminal acts of third parties, but, rather, on the duty of a landlord to
maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. Because the majority would,
contrary to established precedent, adopt a position which makes the status of an
entrant onto land the dispositive factor in determining whether a duty is owed to
that party, because they have opted to draw a concededly arbitrary line of demarcation with respect to the scope of liability, and because the majority's holding would
effectively usurp the power to determine issues which should properly lie within the
province of the jury, I respectfully dissent.
Id. a t 388-89, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 388 (Eiber, J., dissenting).
209. See Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976).
210. See Waters, 116 A.D.2d a t 386-87, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 387.
211. See, e.g., id.
212. The majority's unacknowledged but real dependence on a rejected model of duty
deprived the plaintiff of having the opportunity to establish that a t minimal cost and care.
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Away from the world of crime, the Court of Appeals, in
Dermatossian u. New York City Transit Authority,213reversed the
appellate division which had affirmed a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff.214The plaintiff had supposedly sustained injuries when
he hit his head on a bus grab handle which was defective.216Judge
Hancock, writing for a unanimous Court, examined the two issues
presented.216The first issue arose over a trial court ruling permitting the admission into evidence of proof of the defendant's payment of no-fault, first party benefits.217 The second issue was
raised by the plaintiffs reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa loq~itor.~
The
l ~ Court found for the defendant on both issues on
appeal.21s
Judge Hancock found that the trial court admitted evidence
on the payment of first party benefits because it reflected an admission by the defendant that the plaintiff had, in point of fact,
The jurist noted,
sustained an injury on the defendant's
however:
The payment of no-fault benefits, in response to plaintiffs
facially valid sworn claim that he had been hurt on the bus,
proved nothing more tharl that, a t the time of payment, defendant had determined that there was no valid basis for challenging
the truth of plaintiffs assertions . . . and, thereby, avoiding its
statutory obligation to pay first party benefits promptly after loss

her assailant would not have been able to force her through the unlocked door to face rape
and sodomy. Beyond the scope of this infant plaintiffs tragic encounter with a dangerous
criminal, the duty analysis in Waters does nothing to advance the goal of encouraging landlords to survey their premises and attempt to prevent both minor offenses and major crimes.
Departure from the ancient duty rule was compatible with modern expectations about
buildings and their owners and managers. Public housing officials ought to be under no less
a duty than their private sector counterparts.
It will hardly surprise any reader to learn that the majority of municipal housing
projects in New York City are in exactly those neighborhoods where the type of crime Waters encountered is a serious problem. The hairsplitting and anachronistic reasoning in this
case does little to help control this crime.
213. 67 N.Y.2d 219,492 N.E.2d 1200,501 N.Y.S.2d 784 (19861, reu'g, 109 A.D.2d 1106,
487 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1st Dep't 1985) (mem.).
214. See id. a t 228,492 N.E.2d a t 1205,501 N.Y.S.2d a t 789. It might have been better
to describe the handle as broken or damaged.
215. See id. a t 221, 492 N.E.2d a t 1201, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 785.
216. See id. a t 221-22, 492 N.E.2d a t 1201, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 785.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. a t 222, 492 N.E.2d a t 1201, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 785.
220. See id. at 222-23, 492 N.E.2d a t 1202, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 786.
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Judge Hancock's interpretation for the Court is important in assuring that potential negligence defendants do not hesitate to alleviate and perhaps minimize injuries through the prompt payment
of first party benefits for fear that such payment will constitute
damning evidence inferring liability a t trial. The viewpoint expressed by the plaintiff would have effectively thwarted the public
policy purpose underlying first party payments without aiding in
resolving 1itigati0n.P~~
Justice Hancock's analysis of the res ipsa loquitor issue is less
satisfying. After reviewing the New York doctrine of res ipsa loq ~ i t o r : Justice
~~
Hancock directed his focus to the element of exclusive control.224He found:
[Tlhe plaintiff did not establish control of the grab handle by defendant of sufficient exclusivity to fairly rule out the chance that
the defect in the handle was caused by some agency other than
defendant's negligence. The proof did not adequately exclude the
chance that the handle had been damaged by one or more of defendant's passengers who were invited to use it.226

This treatment of the element of exclusive control, as interpreted
by Judge Hancock and applied to the facts disclosed by the record,
is not mandated by New York case law. A plaintiff need not exclude virtually every possibility that tampering by or the negligence of someone other than the defendant caused the dangerous
injury-producing condition.226
Mesick v.
decided by the Appellate Division, Third

221. Id. a t 222, 492 N.E.2d a t 1202, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 786.
222. See id. a t 225, 492 N.E.2d a t 1203-04, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 787-88.
223. See id. a t 226, 492 N.E.2d a t 1204, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 788.
224. See id. a t 227-28, 492 N.E.2d a t 1205, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 789.
225. Id. a t 228,492 N.E.2d a t 1205, 501 N.Y.S.2d a t 789.
226. Here the bus was in the general and exclusive control of the defendant. Even New
York City buses receive some minimum maintenance each day, but the documentation in
probably not equal to that found in the airline industry. The likelihood that a relatively
minor defect, such as the one which injured plaints, would be both noticed and ignored, ia
an inference permissible under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor and probably true in this
case. They key issue is not whether the defendant itself, through an employee, created the
defect, a highly improbable possibility, but rather whether the existence of the defect, whoever caused it, was the underpinning for the negligence of the defendant in not detecting,
documenting and correcting it in a bus under its exclusive control before the defect caused
harm.
227. 118 A.D.2d 214, 504 N.Y.S.2d 279 (3d Dep't 1986). For a discussion of this case,
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Department, is a case crying for reversal by the Court of Appeals.
A seventeen year-old boy was rendered a quadriplegic when he fell
onto rocks near a hole where he was swimming with friends?28He
had been attempting to use a rope to dive into the water.120 The
property on which the horrible accident took place was stateowned and "[tlhe area was posted with signs limiting the permissible use of the area to fishing."280The majority found that the state
was aware that the pool dedicated for fishing use was also used for
swimming, and that a girl had been injured two years before plaintiffs injury while using a rope to dive frorn.Ps1 "Since the proof
established a likelihood of injury and the foreseeability of claimant's presence on the property, a duty of care arose on the part of
the State."282
Because it appeared to be clear to the majority that mere removal of the rope would have been an inadequate exercise of care,
ropes being easily replaced by adolescent swimming hole enthusiasts, the court suggested that "the risk could have been avoided by
the simple expedient of cutting the tree down."288
In his dissent, Justice Casey first tackled the duty issue?" He
noted that the state developed and used the land where the accident occurred solely for public fishing and that notices to that efApplying General Obligations Law section 9fect were p0sted.4~~
103,4s8Justice Casey noted that fishing is a "use" therein enumerated.s87 He found it illogical to impose upon the state the far
broader standard of reasonable care on the theory that claimant
sustained his injuries while actually engaged in an activity not enumerated in General Obligations Law section 9-103.888
Even if the standard of reasonable care had been applied,

me Gallub, Assessing Culpability in the Law of Torts: A Call for Judicial Scrutiny in Comparing "Culpable Conduct" Under New York's CPLR 1411, 37 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1079
(1987).
228. See id. at 216, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 280-81.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 216, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 280.
231. See id. at 215-16, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 280.
232. Id. at 217, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 281.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 221, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 284 (Casey, J., dissenting).
235. See id.
236. N.Y. GEN.OBLIG.
LAW 3 9-103 (McKiney 1978).
237. See Mesick, 118 A.D.2d at 221, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
238. See id.; see also, N.Y. GEN.OBLIG.
LAW 3 9-103.

Heinonline - - 38 Syracuse L. Rev. 575 1987-1988

576

Syracuse Law Review

[vol. 38:545

rather than duty analysis under the aforementioned ~ t a t u t e , Jus8~~
tice Casey would still have found for the defendant as he found
that the area was only dangerous to those engaged in a prohibited
activity.240Justice Casey then identified the real evil underlying a
finding that the state breached a duty of reasonable care in maintaining the fishing site.241"[Tlhe State should not be required to
undertake drastic measures, which would destroy the scenic and
natural beauty of the site and perhaps render it unfit for its intended purpose . . . .,9242
Twin fallacies underlie the majority's affirmation of the verdict for the plaintiff. The first is that any governmental entity can
absorb multi-million dollar verdicts, such as that rendered here,
and still provide recreational sites and refuges under all but the
most tightly controlled situations. If tight supervision and ongoing
control is mandated, the number of sites must decrease and the
first to go will be the barely improved natural sites so vital not
only for recreation but for conservation. The second fallacy is that
the common law requires the mutilation or destruction of natural
features of public lands so as to make those properties safer for
those who will not, or cannot, comply with clearly posted restrictions. The majority's argument here is on the classical slippery
slope. Once established as a doctrine, a duty to efface natural features of property becomes a mandate for wholesale obliteration as
additional injuries are reported and bureaucrats and administrators place greater value on preventing harm than on preserving nature. Thus, the majority's formulation is inherently impossible to
achieve as a workable standard of due care. The common law has
never equated a reasonable standard of care with the unmeasurable, the unquantifiable, and the unachievable.

239. See Mesick, 118 A.D.2d at 221, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
240. See id. Justice Casey reasoned:
The rocky slope where claimant sustained his injuries was not dangerous to those
who used the premises for its only authorized purpose-fishing. The condition was
dangerous only to those who sought to enhance the thrill of engaging in the prohibited activity of swimming by using an inherently perilous method of entering the
water. As to those persons, the condition was clearly dangerous upon mere
inspection.
Id. (emphasis added).
241. See id.
242. Id.
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New York products liability law continues to develop along its
own track. It is interesting that a fair number of practitioners have
failed, still, to grasp that an action for personal injuries or property
damage caused by a defective product sounds in tort. Counsel continue to bring actions with one cause of action in strict products
liability and a second in breach of warranty without any prayer for
relief under the warranty cause different from that sought under
the strict products liability cause. Perhaps no harm to case or client is caused by this form of pleading but a reasonably close study
of New York case law demonstrates that this approach is doctrinally incorrect. Breach of warranty should only be brought when a
plaintiff is seeking damages recoverable in tort law.
The Court of Appeals decided three products liability cases
during the Survey year worthy of mention. In Rosado v. Proctor &
Schwartz, In~.,2'~
the Court affirmed the dismissal of a cause of
action seeking indemnifi~ation.~"Judge Titone, writing for a unanimous Court, stated:
The issue is whether a manufacturer of a defective product may
obtain indemnification from the purchaser where the sales contract contains a provision requiring the purchaser to install certain safety devices and the purchaser's employee, who is injured
by the failure to install such devices, brings an action against the
manufacturer predicated on the manufacturer's marketing of a
machine that is not reasonably safe.246

The plaintiff was injured by a machine used in the textile ind ~ s t r y . ~Barred
'~
from suing his employer for this industrial accident because of Workers' Compensation, the injured employee
brought a products liability action against the manufacturer of the
machine.247After the trial began but before a verdict was returned,
Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. (Proctor) settled with R o s a d ~ . ~ ' ~

243. 66 N.Y.2d 21, 484 N.E.2d 1354, 494 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1985).
244. See id.
245. Id. at 22, 484 N.E.2d at 1355, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
246. See id. at 23,484 N.E.2d at 1355,494 N.Y.S.2d at 852. The machine is known as a
garnett and is used to convert bunches of clumped fiber into matting.
247. See id.
248. See id. at 23, 484 N.E.2d at 1356, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
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Proctor, not surprisingly, wished to shift all or part of its liability to Rosado onto Comet Fibers, Inc. (Comet), Rosado's employer and the purchaser of the injury-producing machine.24sNew
York law permits, as a general matter, actions for contribution and
indemnifiiation by product manufacturers against the employers
of persons injured by their defective products.P50 The ability to
maintain such an action is, however, dependent on factors not present in R o ~ a d o . ~ ~ '
Proctor, in its third-party action, sought indemnification
based on the failure of Comet to perform according to the sales
contract that required installation of certain safety devices.p5s
Proctor actually wished to place upon Comet full responsibility for
the injury sustained by Rosad0.2~~
The Court rejected Proctor's arguments.P5' The essential purpose of strict liability is to hold the manufacturer of a product ac~ ~ Titone
countable for those defects that cause i n j ~ r y . 8Judge
found:
[Wlhere, as here, the manufacturer is in the best position to know
the dangers inherent in its product, and the dangers do not vary
depending on job site, it is also in the best position to determine
what safety devices should be employed . . . Preventing injuries
in the first place is the primary public policy underlying the doctrine of strict products liability. To allow a manufacturer like
to shift the ultimate duty of care to others through
Proctor
boilerplate language in a sales contract, would erode the economic
incentive manufacturers have to maintain safety and give sanction to the marketing of dangerous, stripped down machine^.'^

.

...

This well-reasoned, unanimous decision should set straight the
boundaries of permissible third-party claims for relief in the industrial accident field. It is natural that machinery and product manufacturers, obviously aware that the institution of litigation against
them is often a t least partially spurred by the unavailability to the

249. See id. at 23,484 N.E.2d at 1355-56,494 N.Y.S.2d at 852-53.
250. See, e.g., Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 35 A.D.2d 149,316 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1970). rev'd, 30
N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
251. See Rosado, 66 N.Y.2d at 23, 484 N.E.2d at 1355, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
252. See id. at 22-23,484 N.E.2d at 1355, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
253. See id. at 23, 484 N.E.2d at 1356,494 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
254. See id. at 25, 484 N.E.2d at 1357,494 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
255. See id.
256. Id. at 26-27, 484 N.E.2d at 1358, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
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plaintiff of a tort remedy against an employer, would look to the
employer to share or absorb the burden. Judge Titone's opinion
states that this is unacceptable in what, on analysis, is the majority
of lawsuits brought by injured employees. Manufacturers concerned about this liability and who are in a strong bargaining position-the purchaser needs the supplier more than the supplier
needs the purchaser-ought to incorporate clear indemnification
provisions in sales contracts. This form of potential loss shifting
does not raise any public policy issues or problems discussed by
Judge Titone in Rosado.
Although not discussed in the Court's opinion in Rosado, it
seems fairly clear that sales contracts in which a purchaser undertakes to install safety equipment that the seller knows should be
furnished before use of the product are very unlikely to be performed as written. An experienced manufacturer, selling highly
specialized industrial machinery, is under no illusions as to the operating milieu of his equipment. Proctor could not have seriously
expected that most of their customers would hasten to install
safety devices mentioned in the sales contract. To allow a manufacturer-seller to rely upon such a provision would make a mockery
of the public policy underlying strict products liability.
Illustrating the importance of evidentiary matters in complex
products liability litigation is the Court of Appeals decision in
Sawyer u. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co.267Plaintiff was injured by a sheet metal shaping machine and brought an action
against the manufacturer of the machine.268The manufacturer
brought a third-party action against Cambridge Filter Corporation,
plaintiffs employer.268The appellate court afErmed a jury verdict
for the plaintiff but New York's final judicial forum reversed and
granted a new trial.g60The Court found error in all the issues
under con~ideration.~~~
"The principal issue . . . is whether the trial
court committed error in submitting the question of plaintiffs amnesia to the jury in the absence of expert testimony supporting his
claim or causally relating the amnesia to the accident . . . and in
permitting plaintiffs engineering expert to testify how the accident

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

67 N.Y.2d 328, 493 N.E.2d 920, 502 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1986).
See id. at 331,493 N.E.2d at 922, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
See id.
See id. at 332, 493 N.E.2d at 922, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
See id.
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happened."262
The Court reviewed what it termed to be the "familiar law"263
concerning the lessened burden placed upon an accident victim
whose amnesia precludes testifying as to the events of the incident.264The issue to be decided in Sawyer was whether an expert
was required to establish an evidentiary foundation for amnesia
because, as the Court noted, this condition can be feigned.265Although most prior cases apparently featured expert testimony, the
question of whether it is required was novel.266
The Court concluded that the testimony of the plaintiff in
which he claimed amnesia alone, without expert testimony, was insufficient to allow him to benefit from the lessened burden of the
amnesiac.267This evidentiary holding, of course, goes beyond products liability litigation. In the future, in all tort actions in which
amnesia of a plaintiff is claimed, sufficient foundation by a qualithe Court of
fied expert must be presented.26eIn Smith v. Stark,ZBB
Appeals affirmed the appellate division's granting of a pool manufacturer's motion for summary judgment.270The plaintiff was injured when he either dove or was thrown by friends into a pool
manufactured by the defendant.271The Court found that if he
dove into the pool, he had to have been aware that he was entering
the shallow end and if he was thrown into the water, the failure of
the manufacturer to place depth markers was irrelevant.272What is

262. Id.
263. See id. a t 333-34, 493 N.E.2d a t 923-24, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t 699-700.
264. See id. a t 333-34, 493 N.E.2d a t 923, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
265. See id. a t 334, 493 N.E.2d a t 924, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t 700.
266. See id.; see also Barker, Evidence, supra this Survey.
267. See id. at 335, 493 N.E.2d a t 924, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t 700. The Court found:
Amnesia, like most medical conditions, is beyond the understanding of laymen and
expert evidence on the matter is not only helpful, it is required if plaintiff is to
prove the condition by clear and convincing evidence . . . . [Wlithout the aid of
experts, a jury of laymen is not capable of evaluating the effects of a trauma or the
symptoms which may verify a loss of memory and indicate that it is real and not
feigned. In the absence of expert evidence establishing a loss of memory and its
causal relationship to defendant's fault, the jury may not consider the question or
apply a lesser degree of proof in evaluating plaintiffs claim . . .
Id. a t 334-35, 493 N.E.2d a t 924, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t 700.
268. See id.
269. 67 N.Y.2d 693,490 N.E.2d 841,499 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1986), aff'g, 111 A.D.2d 913,490
N.Y.S.2d 811 (2d Dep't 1985).
270. See id. a t 695, 490 N.E.2d a t 842,499 N.Y.S.2d a t 923.
271. See id. a t 694, 490 N.E.2d a t 842, 499 N.Y.S.2d a t 923.
272. See id.

.
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surprising is that this action seems to have been brought solely
sounding in negligence.273
As discussed in the Medical Malpractice
actions
based on prenatal injuries continue to be
In the products liability field, similar actions are brought. In Catherwood v.
American Sterilizer C 0 . y the plaintiffs sought damages for preconception harm to the mother because of exposure to the defendant's chemical
The mother's exposure allegedly caused
chromosomal alteration in the child subsequently conceived.278
Justice Mintz granted the defendant's motion to d i s m i ~ s . 2 ~ ~
Relying upon Albala v. City of New Y ~ r kthe
, ~justice
~ ~ found that
no analytic approach permitted a finding that any tort cause of
action exists in New York for alleged precdnception
The
jurist's concise and well-written opinion is an excellent and precise
discussion of this subject.
A twist on the recurrent efforts of employees to find some way
to skirt employers' insulation from tort liability because of Workers' Compensation is provided by Copp v. Corning Glass Works.282
In Copp, an injured employee sued his former employer which had
Cornsold the injury causing machine to his present empl0yer.2~~
ing, however, was not the original purchaser of the machine.284The
court f i r m e d the dismissal of the action, noting that the "defendant, successor to the original purchaser . . . had no part in . . .
design or manufacture and had made no modifications which increased the risk of injury."286
While the approach in Copp was creative, it lacked any foundation in law. A manufacturer who is a successor to the original
manufacturer of a defective product may be liable to a victim, but
a successor purchaser certainly is not.

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

See id.
See supra notes 1-62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
130 hlisc. 2d 872, 498 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct., Erie Co. 1986).
See id. at 873, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
See id.
See id. at 875-76, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
54 N.Y.2d 269, 429 N.E.2d 786, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981).
See Catherwood, 130 Misc. 2d at 875, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
114 A.D.2d 144, 497 N.Y.S.2d 970 (4th Dep't 1986).
See id. at 145, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
See id.
See id. at 146, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
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Numerous injuries are sustained annually because of defective
equipment that was purchased in a used condition. Whether strict
products liability applies to actions based on harm caused by used
equipment requires close factual analysis. In Sukljian v. Charles
the
~ ~Appellate Division, Third Department,
Ross & Son C O . , ~
found, as a matter of law, that strict products liability does not
apply when the defendant was an occasional seller not regularly
engaged in selling the product, or the type of product, which
caused
In this case, the machinery sold was specifically
offered on a "As Is Where Is" basis and was a sale of surplus
In affirming a summary judgment for an equipment manufacturer, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Silverstein v.
Walsh Press & Die C O . , disposed
~~~
of an action based upon an
injury produced by a machine manufactured in 1947.290The appellate panel agreed that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate any
proximate causation linking the manufacturer of the thirty-yearold punch press with the defect that caused plaintiffs injury.2e1
The machine had been modified over its service
This is the
sort of vexatious case which suggests the wisdom of a statute of
repose for New York State.
Intervening conduct, of either a tortious or a criminal nature,
may break the chain of causation linking an injury to an alleged
defect in a product. The problem, of course, is to determine at
what point the conduct of an actor insulates a seller or manufacturer from strict products liability. This point was dealt with by
the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Craft v. Mid Island
Department Stores, Inc.2ss The infant plaintiff, wearing a sweatshirt manufactured and distributed by the defendants, was severely burned when he and a playmate were pouring gasoline and
It is unclear whether the burned child or the
lighting the
playmate lit the match that caused the injury-producing flash of

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

116 A.D.2d 9, 499 N.Y.S.2d 466 (3d Dep't 1986).
See id. at 12, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
See id.
119 A.D.2d 658, 501 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2d Dep't 1986).
See id. at 658, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 98.
See id. at 659-60, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 98.
See id. at 659, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 98.
112 A.D.2d 969, 492 N.Y.S.2d 780 (2d Dep't 1985).
See id. at 969, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
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fire.2gVhile recognizing that New York law precludes recovery
where a plaintiff has engaged in "serious criminal or illegal conthe court found that rule to be inapplicable in the instant
case.2g7"Here none of the defendants point to any penal statute
applicable to the use of gasoline."298 In any event, "the Court of
Appeals has permitted plaintiffs to bring suit where they might
have been guilty of minor criminal offenses."299
An attempt to hold a trade association strictly liable for its
role in the promulgation and dissemination of standards for tires
and tire rims was rejected in Beasock u. Dioguardi Enterprises,
I ~ C . ~ O OPlaintiffs decedent had succumbed to injuries received
when he attempted to inflate a tire mounted on a rim too large for
the tire.s01 While the court recognized the importance of the defendant Tire and Rim Association in the industry,s02 the court
found that the trade association did not manufacture or market
the tire products that were alleged to have caused the injury and,
hence, could not be held liable.80s
B. Dram Shop
Demon Rum is still with us and along with intoxicating liquors
come a continuing host of tort issues. As noted in previous Survey
articles:04 New York continues to decline, either through judicial
decision or legislative enactment, to create liability for social hosts
who serve alcohol to inebriated guests who subsequently injure
someone.s05

295. See id.
296. See id. a t 971, 492 N.Y.S.2d a t 782.
297. See id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. 130 Misc. 2d 25, 494 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 1985).
301. See id. a t 26, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t 975.
302. See id. a t 28, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t 977.
303. See id. a t 29, 494 N.Y.S.2d a t 978. The court found:
Since TRA does not manufacture or market tires or rims generally and did not
manufacture or market the tire or rim alleged to have caused the injury in this case,
liability cannot be imposed upon it under the theories of either strict products liability or breach of warranty. These actions impose liability only against defendants
who are directly involved in the manufacture or distribution of the product which
caused the injury. See id.
304. See, e.g., Torts, 1984 Survey, supra note 3, a t 624; Stein, Torts, 1983 Survey of
N.Y. Law, 35 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 651,670-71 (1984).
305. See supra note 304.
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In Conigliaro v. F r a n ~ othe
, ~ Appellate
~~
Division, Second Department, reversed the trial court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment.s07The victim, in Conigliaro, sustained
serious injuries in a car crash with a man who had recently left the
defendants' home after consuming about five cans of beer.308The
plaintiff attempted to bring the defendants within the scope of
In this case, not only did the plainNew York's Dram Shop
tiff fail to meet her burden of showing there had been a sale of
alcohol to the man who injured her, "but it appear[ed] from the
plaintiffs opposition papers that before instituting this action she
possessed sufficient facts to indicate that the appellants could not
be held liable under the Dram Shop Act . . . ."310 Not only was the
plaintiffs claim legally without merit, but the role of her counsel in
bringing this action is open to questi~n.~"
In Powers v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,812 Justice Mercure refused to apply the provisions of the Dram Shop Act where
underage and sober purchasers bought beer from a defendant eight
hours before causing an injury in an automobile accident.31s The
justice reviewed all relevant legislation and analyzed the legislative
history underlying General Obligations Law section 11-100,814
which creates a cause of action against a person who furnishes alcohol to anyone under the age of nineteen where the person so provided with alcohol causes physical injury.s15Justice Mercure found

306. 122 A.D.2d 15, 504 N.Y.S.2d 186 (2d Dep't 1986).
307. See id.
308. See id. a t 16, 504 N.Y.S.2d a t 186.
309. See N.Y. GEN.OBLIG.LAW3 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1987).
310. See Conigliaro, 122 A.D.2d a t 16, 504 N.Y.S.2d a t 187.
311. See id.
312. 132 Misc. 2d 123, 503 N.Y.S.2d 516 (Sup. Ct., Schenectady Co. 1986).
313. See id. a t 126-27, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t 517-18.
314. See N.Y. GEN.OBLIG.LAW3 11-100(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
315. See Powers, 132 Misc. 2d a t 125, 503 N.Y.S.2d a t 518. New York General Obligations Law section 11-100(1) provides:
Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of support or otherwise,
by reason of the intoxication or impairment of ability of any person under the age
of nineteen years, whether resulting in his death or not, shall have a right of action
to recover actual damages against any person who knowingly causes such intoxication or impairment of ability by unlawfully furnishing to or unlawfully assisting in
procuring alcoholic beverages for such person with knowledge or reasonable cause to
believe that such person was under age of nineteen years.
N.Y. GEN.OBLIG.LAW$ 11-100(1) (the action accrued in 1983, two years before the drinking
age was increased to twenty-one).
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this provision to be inapplicable to the case at bar.316
Justice Mercure's analysis is sound, but the result reached is
not tolerable. There is a major public policy purpose in keeping
alcoholic beverages out of the possession of those too young to be
legally allowed to drink. Application of the Dram Shop Act is difficult enough because of the plaintiffs need to prove that the purchaser was intoxicated at the time he or she acquired alcohol from
a defendant seller. With juveniles, the issue is much broader than
the question of intoxication at point-of-sale. Without alcohol,
young and inexperienced drivers are involved in a disproportionate
number of both minor and major accidents. With alcohol, the odds
of a serious or fatal accident increase dramatically. The Powers
case illustrates a vacuum in the law which must be addressed either by the extension of common law duty or by legislative action.

VI. INTENTIONAL
TORTS
A. Privacy and Publicity
As New York continues to be one of the minority of jurisdictions
which lack either a common law right of privacy or a broad statutory protection of privacy interests, privacy invasion allegations in
New York are generally confined to actions brought under sections
5OSl7and 5lSl8of the Civil Rights Law. Plaintiffs who have suffered
what amounts to an invasion of privacy often also resort to pleading, sometimes inappropriately, libel or causes of action such as
intentional infliction of emotional distress and prima facie tort.
In Smith v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside,S1*the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the trial court and dismissed
a complaint that essentially raised privacy issues.320The plaintiffs
sought to recover for the emotional distress which they experienced because of the fatal illness of their nine-month-old infant.321
In Smith, the parents apparently were unaware of either the diagnosis or the prognosis of their baby until a few weeks before the
baby's
They apparently gained their knowledge of the

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See Powers, 132 Misc. 2d at 127, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
See N.Y. CN. RIGHTS
LAW8 50 (McKiney 1976).
See N.Y. CN. RIGHTS
LAW 8 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987).
118 A.D.2d 553, 499 N.Y.S.2d 167 (2d Dep't 1986).
See id. at 554-55, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
See id. at 554, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
See id.
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prognosis when they read an article in a local newspaper which,
without naming their baby, referred to a critically ill baby in the
defendant's pediatric intensive care unit as "doomed."sas The
description of the mortally ill child was sufficient for the parents to
recognize that the subject of the article was their baby.ss4 While
the insensitivity of hospital personnel in releasing information sufficient to allow uninformed parents to learn the truth of their
child's condition through a news article is revolting, no cause of
action in New York can arise from this type of incident.sa6
Almost two years after the death of the baby, however, the
plaintiffs "saw photographs of their child displayed in the defendant hospital and in a shopping center as part of a campaign advertising the opening of defendant's new children's hospital."sa8
The defendant, in moving to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint,
admitted that had the infant been alive, a violation of his rights
under the relevant New York Civil Rights statutess7 would have
been committed.sas The defendant argued that this type of cause
of action is extinguished at death, that no such right can be raised
where the photograph of a deceased person is used, and that the
plaintiffs therefore could not raise a statutory cause of action.'ag
The trial court agreed and the appellate panel of the Second Department
The appellate court also found no merit in
the plaintiffs causes of action for prima facie tort and intentional
infliction of mental distress.ss1
What are we to make of such a case? The existing case law
does bar a cause of action under the civil rights statutes where the
commercial use is of the the name or likeness of a dead person.s8a
How can such behavior be not only unsanctionable, but implicitly
recognized as lawful as the court in Smith has done? The competition among hospitals today, including teaching institutions such as

323. See id.
324. See id.
325. See id. at 555, 499 N.Y.S.2d a t 168-69.
326. See id. at 554, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
327. See N.Y. CN. RIGHTS
LAW8 50.
328. See Smith, 118 A.D.2d at 554,499 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
329. See id. at 554, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 167.
330. See id. at 555, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 169.
331. See id.
332. See, e.g., Schuman v. Loew's, Inc., 144 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Sup. Ct, N.Y. Co. 1955); Robertson v. Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
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Long Island Jewish, has reached unprecedented proportions. The
~
hospitals take out weekly emotional a d ~ e r t i s e m e n t sor~ ~produce
large and professionally impressive glossy supplements to Sunday
newspapers such as the New York Times.334Surely there are many
people who will gladly, either gratuitously or for compensation,
consent to photographs of themselves or their children appearing
in these advertisements, the sole purpose of which are to attract
new and more patients.
Smith demonstrates the type of harm that has been allowed to
go unchecked because New York's courts have not expanded the
tort of negligent infliction of mental distress to match the variety
of conditions which regularly arise and merit common law treatment. Measuring the facts of the case by a negligence standard, it
would not have been difficult for the Smiths to establish a prima
facie demonstration that the defendant failed to adhere to a reasonable standard of care once the duty to exercise such care was
acknowledged. No one will question the anguish of the parents.
The result in Smith should encourage New York jurists, and especially the members of the Court of Appeals, to reconsider the issue
of broadening the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The common law tradition provides a rich heritage for recognizing
the need for contemporary and continuing adaptation.
In another civil rights statutory action involving the use of the
name of a deceased person, Justice Salman, Supreme Court,
Bronx, dismissed an Article 78 petition.ss6 In contrast to
the husband, daughter and son of a dein Antonetty v. Cuom0,9~~
ceased woman objected to the renaming of a three acre Bronx site

333. St. Vincent's Hospital in the Greenwich Village section of Manhattan, for some
months, has been running a human interest advertisement in the Wednesday edition of The
New York Times. Each "story" tells of some aspect of the hospital's operations and while
not every medical case ends with a happy and full recovery, each advertisement stresses the
caring aspect of all of St. Vincent's staff members. While such advertisements are not in
themselves objectionable, the economic factors underlying these campaigns indicate both
the emergence of policy choice issues with regard to health care provisions and possible new
tort liability based on commercial advertising. These advertising institutions may be offering, in some instances, more than they can deliver.
334. The defendant hospital in this case prepared a supplement to The New York
Times Sunday edition to announce many of its services and special facilities.
335. See Antonetty v. Cuomo, 131 Misc. 2d 1041,502 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co.
1986).
336. See Smith, 118 A.D.2d a t 553, 499 N.Y.S.2d a t 167.
337. 131 Misc. 2d 1041, 502 N.Y.S.2d 902.
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from "Fordham Plaza" to "Evelina Antonetty Mall and Park."338
It is not clear from Justice Salman's opinion-perhaps it was not
clear to him-why these relatives objected to the naming of a site
in honor of a woman who apparently was an outstanding community leader.33BWhat is clear is that the civil rights statutes do not,
as covered in the prior discussion of the Smith case, afford a cause
of action when the person whose privacy is allegedly invaded is
dead.s40It is also clear that by no rational interpretation could the
action of the State of New York, through the Urban Development
Corporation, be viewed as the commercial appropriation of a name
or likeness as statutorily required.341
In another civil rights privacy case, the Appellate Division,
First Department, dismissed an action brought by a transit police
officer for invasion of
The plaintiff officer alleged improper production of records relating to an incident in which the
officer had shot the owner of an antiques store.34sIn Simpson v.
New York City Transit Authority:"
the court found that the relevant statute, section 50-a of the New York Civil Rights
does
make "police personnel records confidential and requires either the
written consent of the officer involved or a court order before any
such records may be released to a third party."346 The court then
found that the legislative history of this statute reflected a desire
"to curb abusive use of a police officer's personnel record in connection with such officer's appearance as a witness."s47 The court
found that the Legislature did not intend to create, through this
statute, a private right of action and none exists.s48In dismissing
Simpson's action, the court also found no merit in his claim of a
violation of his federally guaranteed civil rights.s4g

338. See id. a t 1044, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t 903.
339. See id. a t 1043, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t 903-04.
340. See id. a t 1046, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t 906.
341. See id. a t 1045, 502 N.Y.S.2d a t 905.
342. 112 A.D.2d 89, 491 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1st Dep't 1985).
343. See id. a t 89-90, 491 N.Y.S.2d a t 646.
344. See id. a t 89, 491 N.Y.S.2d a t 645.
345. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW$ 50-a (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987).
346. See Simpson, 112 A.D.2d a t 89, 491 N.Y.S.2d a t 646.
347. See id. a t 90, 491 N.Y.S.2d a t 647.
348. See id.
349. The court correctly noted that an allegation of a single incident of alleged deprivation of rights guaranteed under title 42 of United States Code section 1983 was insufficient
to properly state a claim based on that statute.
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To finish this year's discussion of invasion of privacy on the
lighter side, the Appellate Division, First Department's treatment
of Creel v. Crown Publishers,
is discussed. Plaintiffs appeared nude in a photograph in a 1983 book, World Guide to Nude
. ~ ~ plaintiffs
~
alleged that their photoBeaches and R e c r e a t i ~ nThe
graphs appeared without their permission.362
In a memorandum decision, the appellate bench found that
the cause of action was barred by the public interest classification
of the subject material of the book.353The court held that this classification included the photograph of the plaintiffs gambling in the
bufF in St. Maarten.364"A guide to beaches where nude bathing is
permitted is a matter of some public interest and the use of photographs with the text is protected by constitutional safeguards and
is outside the protection of the Civil Rights Law."355
B. Libel and Slander

The discussion of libel and slander cases decided during the
Survey year is begun with the most poorly reasoned decision of the
year. In Dally u. Orange County publication^,^^^ the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the trial court's denial of
summary judgment for the defendant newspaper, and dismissed
the plaintiff's action.367The plaintiff, a deputy sheriff, was the subject of an unauthorized advertisement in the personals section of
the defendant's Classified Market Guide.368 The advertisement
listed "plaintiff's first name and telephone number as the person to
contact for further information regarding the meetings of a
Monroe chapter of the 'Gay Community Center.' "359
In addition, a similar advertisement concerning the plaintiff

350. 115 A.D.2d 414, 496 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1st Dep't 1985).
351. See id. This book is a professionally-produced guide to nude beaches. Its production values are high and it is clearly intended for a serious readership either already committed to nude recreation or considering the possibility. The book in no way seeks to exploit
sexuality. Even if permission were not obtained from a subject of a photograph, it is difficult
to see what rights would be violated if the photographs were taken in a public place.
352. See id.
353. See id. a t 415-16, 496 N.Y.S.2d a t 220-21.
354. See id. a t 416, 496 N.Y.S.2d a t 220.
355. Id. a t 415-16, 496 N.Y.S.2d a t 220.
356. 117 A.D.2d 577, 497 N.Y.S.2d 947 (2d Dep't 1986).
357. See id.
358. See id.
359. Id. at 577, 497 N.Y.S.2d a t 947-48.
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had been published by the defendant one-and-a-half years earlier.360As a result of the prior incident involving the plaintiff, the
publisher had instituted a telephonic verification of advertisements
"of a sensitive nature."s61 It is clear that this procedure was not
used when the second advertisement, purportedly originating with
the plaintiff, was placed.362
The court begins its analysis by stating:
If the plaintiff in a defamation action against a newspaper is a
public official and the defamation relates to his official conduct,
the plaintiff must establish actual malice, i.e., that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge of its falsity or with
reckless disregard of the truth, before he may recover damages

....

98s

Applying the New York Times v. Sullivans64standard, the court
assumed that because a deputy sheriff may be a public official, a
deputy sheriff appearing in a libel action as a plaintiff is also considered to be a public official and must prove actual malice in order to prevail.366
The New York Times standard was articulated in order to
protect the press when its news, and even feature, stories contain
defamatory falsehoods.366Virtually all cases which correctly apply
the New York Times standard concern material generated by the
staff of a defendant media organization and published as either
news or a news-related feature. The personals column of a newspaper cannot by any logical analysis be considered news or a newsrelated feature. There is absolutely nothing newsworthy about the
modern personals column. All the advertisements in a personals
column, whether published for consideration or as a free service,
are authored by persons not under the control of the news and
advertising staff. The assumption is that individuals write and
place their own advertisements but the obvious scope of potential
abuse has led most newspapers and magazines which accept such
notices to adopt some verification procedure.

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

See id. at 577, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
See id.
See id. at 578, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 948.

Id.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See Dally, 117 A.D.2d at 578, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254.
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It should also seem obvious that Dally's status as a deputy
sheriff is irrelevant here. The item was placed in the defendant's
column undoubtedly with the intent to cause embarrassment to
Dally. There is no newsworthy component whatsoever in this
spurious advertisement. A deputy sheriff is not so high an official
that he or she carries the status of public official into every facet of
personal life and no case law has so held.
The plaintiff in Dally was unable to prove actual malice
against the defendant.s67Actual malice is one of the most difficult
burdens of proof for a plaintiff to meet and the New York Times
formulation undoubtedly deters and derails many actions. The
New York Times standard was never intended to cloak slothful,
ordinary negligence in the publishing of reader-generated
advertisements.
A number of cases involving the media were decided during
the Survey year. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in Fitzgerald u. Herald
The court found that a factual issue existed as
to the degree of negligence of a reporter who erroneously described
the plaintiff as having been arrested a t a DWI heckp point?^^
In Ocean State Seafood u. Capital Newspaper,s70 the Appellate Division, Third Department, sustained the trial court's denial
of a motion for summary judgment by the defendant newspaper.371
An article in the defendant's newspaper had reported on illness
caused by fresh seafood and suggested that avarice and greed underlay the decision to sell possibly contaminated seafood.s72 The
Third Department found that there was sufEcient evidence offered
by the plaintiff to raise a material issue of fact for trial?73
Another media case concerned a diversity action which alleged
both common law libel and a violation of New York Civil Rights
Law.a74Specifically, the case concerned the issue of commercial appropriation of a name or likeness without permission.375In Nelson

367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

See Dally, 117 A.D.2d at 579, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 949.

119 A.D.2d 974, 500 N.Y.S.2d 871 (4th Dep't 1986).
See id.

112 A.D.2d 662, 492 N.Y.S.2d 175 (3d Dep't 1985).
id. at 666, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 179.
id. at 663-64, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
id. at 665,492 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
Nelson v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
id.

See
See
See
See
See
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u. Globe International,
the plaintiff Nelson, an employee of
the New York Bureau of Nutrition, was described in defendant's
publication as being "instrumental in preparing this marshmallowbased diet to help GLOBE readers lose up to a pound a day."377
The plaintiff was not pleased.378
While the Bureau of Nutrition which employed Nelson is a
public agency, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York found that Nelson was not a public official
within the meaning of New York Times u. Sullivan.s7s The court
also found that Nelson was not a "limited purpose" public
figure.380
The real problem with the plaintiffs case is that the author of
the article to which she objected was a free-lance journali~t.~~'
Under New York law, the journalist had the status of an independent contractor and the facts show that the defendant in no way
controlled or directed the journalist's activities.382Thus, Nelson's
action against the defendant failed.38s
Another action also alleged a combination of libel and a violation of section 51 of New York Civil Rights Law.384Quezada By
DeLamota v. Daily News,S8swas discussed in last year's Survey,S88
and was reviewed by the Appellate Division, First Department,
during the current Survey year.387This action was based upon an
article in the defendant's newspaper about juvenile drug trafficking.388To accompany the article, a free-lance artist was told to
draw a picture of children engaged in drug sales.38sThe plaintiffs
alleged that they were recognizable in the published drawing.ss0

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

See id.
See id. at 971.
See id.
376 U.S. 254.
See Nelson, 626 F. Supp. at 975-76.
See id. at 977-78.
See id. at 978-79.
See id. at 978.
See N.Y. CN. RIGHTSLAW3 51.
130 Misc. 2d 842, 501 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1st Dep't 1986).
See Torts, 1984 Survey, supra note 3, at 673-76.
See Quezada, 130 Misc. 2d at 842, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
See id.
See id. at 844, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
See id. at 843, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
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The plaintiffs were not involved in drug deals in any manner.391
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the libel causes of action but permitted the privacy
causes of action to stand.392In a per curium opinion, the First Department held that the matters covered in the article were of public concern and thus the plaintiffs were obliged to demonstrate
It is obvious that this standard of proof
gross irrespon~ibility.~~~
was difficult, if not impossible, for the plaintiffs to meet because
the artist was a free-lance contract~r.~~'
The court refused to apply a different standard for analyzing
The court
the statutory invasion of privacy cause of acti0n.9~~
noted:
Given the close connection between privacy and defamation
claims, particularly in the area of first amendment concerns, it is
clear that a heightened degree of fault must be shown before section 51 sanctions can be imposed against a media defendant for a
publication about a newsworthy event or a matter of public interSO6
est.

...

In another libel action, the Second Department found that to
say that a lawyer "went crazy" when certain aspects of a real estate
transaction were not completed did not constitute words sufficient
to support a libel action.387In O'Brien v. L e r r n ~ n , 5the
~ ~appellate
division reversed the trial court and held that the words complained of "cannot reasonably be understood by the mind of the
ordinary intelligent reader as imputing to plaintiff insanity or
mental instability . . . .,9388
The importance of privilege as a bar to defamation actions was
reflected in the three following cases decided during the Survey
year. In Kaplan u. MacNamara,'OO the Appellate Division, Second

391. See id.
392. See id.
393. See id. at 845, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 973-74.
394. The record demonstrates, as summarized by the court, that the illustrator was specifically told not to draw recognizable people. See id. at 844, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 973-74. This
fact alone probably defeats any theory of gross irresponsibility.
395. See id. at 846, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
396. Id. at 847, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
397. See O'Brien v. Lerman, 117 A.D.2d 658, 498 N.Y.S.2d 395 (2d Dep't 1986).
398. Id.
399. See id. at 659, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
400. 116 A.D.2d 626, 497 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2d Dep't 1986).
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Department, affirmed summary judgment for the defendants.401
The plaintiff, a former university faculty member, alleged defamaThe plaintiff failed to
tion in the course of a tenure evaluati~n.'~~
meet his burden to show the degree of personal malice that would
strip away the qualified privilege normally protecting communications generated in the course of a tenure review.'OS Tenure denials
breed much bitterness and not an insignificant amount of litigation. If the tenure process is to be based on forthright and open
evaluations, the qualified privilege must be sustained as the Second Department recognized.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, also affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant in Mock v. LaGuardia Hospital-HIP Hospital, Inc.'04 This libel action arose from an attempt
by plaintiffs to organize a union a t the defendant hospital.'05 The
plaintiffs were supervisory personnel and the defendant discharged
them for impermissible labor a~tivity.'~The alleged libel consisted
of statements made by the defendant to the National Labor Relations Board in connection with the dispute.'07 The court found
that a qualified privilege was clearly controlling in this case.'08
In Jafar v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,'OS a complaint was dismissed upon a finding of law that an absolute privilege appliedFO
The plaintiff-physician, who was under investigation for allegedly
overcharging medicare patients, brought an action against a fellow
doctor who testified to the plaintiffs detriment at an investigation
hearing.'ll While the court found that the statements made by Dr.
Segal, a defendant, were biased and "inexcusable;" the court concluded that the nature of the hearing mandated the application of
the absolute immunity rule."%
Jafar demonstrates again that the price of encouraging open
and useful disclosures a t quasi-judicial hearings may well be the

401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

See id. at 628,497 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
See id. at 626-27, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 711.
See id. at 628,497 N.Y.S.2d at 712.

117 A.D.2d 721,498 N.Y.S.2d 446 (2d Dep't 1986).
id. at 722, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 447.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.

129 Misc. 2d 584, 493 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1985).
See id. at 585, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
See id.
See id. at 588-89, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
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tolerance of occasional unhelpful and malevolent abuse of the immunity which attends testifying a t such hearings.'13
Extravagant claims by car salespersons occasiondy produce
consumer litigation. McMilliam v. Atlantic Oldsmobile, Ltd."'
may be the first reported case in which plaintiffs successfully alleged slander per se against a salesperson employed by the defendant.'16 The plaintiffs, apparently married, wanted to buy a car and
the credit transaction that they sought to conclude was only available to married couple^."^ The salesperson, defendant Levine, apparently put the requirement of marriage, a credit requirement,
before his desire to sell the plaintiffs a car.'17 He stated, in the
hearing of a third person, "I don't believe you are really married to
each other . . . .You are trying to pull a fast
The Appellate
Division, Second Department, found that Levine's words impute
the commission of a crime to the plaintiffs and are thus
actionableYS
In Loughry v. Lincoln First Bank, N.A.,'20 the Court of Appeals sustained a jury award based on a finding that the plaintiff
had been slandered and the trial court's striking of an award by
the jury of punitive damages.'21 The plaintiff-employee was fired
after being informed in a meeting that he was dealing in illicit
drugs and that he had misappropriated bank property.'22 The
Court held that the jury award of punitive damages was unwarranted because the plaintiff was unable to establish the involvement of the employer in the slanderous statements made by its
employee.423

C. Miscellaneous Intentional Torts
Virtually every case in which a plaintiff attempts to sustain a
cause of action for prima facie tort reflects the courts' extreme re-

413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

See id.
115 A.D.2d 645, 496 N.Y.S.2d 481 (2d Dep't 1985).
See id. at 645-46, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
See id. at 645, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
See id.

Id.
See id. at 645-46, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
67 N.Y.2d 369, 494 N.E.2d 70, 502 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1986).
See id. at 381, 494 N.E.2d at 77, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
See id. at 373-74, 494 N.E.2d at 72, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
See id. at 377, 494 N.E.2d at 74-75, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 969-70.
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luctance to recognize that tort. The Appellate Division, First Department, in Halperin v. Sal~an,'~'found that an amended complaint sufficiently alleged a prima facie tort cause of action.4z5This
action was brought by an attorney against several defendants for
libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and against an
attorney defendant on the theory of prima facie tort as well.'46 The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had initiated, with malice and
with no lawful purpose, a lawsuit for the sole purpose of injuring
Thus, the elements of the prima fathe plaintiff professi~nally.~~~
cie tort cause of action were found to be adequately pleaded.(48
In view of the fact that the plaintiff may have problems demonstrating the requisite degree of mental distress necessary for his
intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action-a problem common to most litigants who raise this tort action-the
court's recognition of the facial merits of his pleading was a real
advantage to him.
While reported tort assault and battery actions are somewhat
uncommon today, two such decisions were handed down during
the Survey year. The Appellate Division, Third Department, in
O'Reilly v. Executone of Albany, I ~ C .sustained
, ' ~ ~ the sufficiency
of a complaint which alleged battery as well as intentional inflicIt
tion of emotional distress in the context of sexual haras~ment.'~~
is clear from the brief opinion of the court that the type of conduct
which plaintiff alleged is of the variety not physically harmful, but
that is nonetheless offensive and unwelcome.4s1Because battery is
completed when there is an unwanted, intentional offensive physical contact not justified by law, attorneys should consider including a cause of action for this tort in all sexual harassment actions
where there has been any touching. The very term, "battery," has
a certain emotional import, and proving a cause of action in battery may help to convey to a jury the totality of wrongfulness inherent in the sexual harassment incident.

424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.

117 A.D.2d 544, 499 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1st Dep't 1986).
See id. at 546, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 57-58.
See id. at 545, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 57.
See id. at 546-47, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
See id.
121 A.D.2d 772, 503 N.Y.S.2d 185 (3d Dep't 1986).
See id. at 774, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
See id. at 773, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 185-86.
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In Rodriguez v. J o h n s ~ n , 'the
~ ~ plaintiff charged that the defendant Janet Johnson, a bus matron, was liable for slapping her
child.433Both plaintiff and defendant appeared pro se in the Small
Claims Part of the Civil Court of the City of New Y01-k.'~' Judge
Taylor found that no condition existed to justify the application of
force by the defendant to the plaintiffs
She found for the
plaintiff in the sum of $250.00.'36 Her well-reasoned opinion ends
with her observation:
I t is time for the civil law to recognize that children are entitled
to equal protection. The tort of battery, which once protected
only the bodily integrity of men, must now protect all persons, be
they adults or children, from unauthorized physical contact.
Physical abuse in even the slightest degree seriously harms children. It is not only immoral and unethical, but also unfair and
unjust and therefore intrinsically illegal. I t is most appropriate to
consider such abuse as the tort of battery.'37

VII. CONCLUSION
The impact of the new legislative enactments designed to alleviate the malpractice situation should become assessable during
the next year. Whether these new laws provide some relief for the
medical community, the fact remains that medical malpractice is a
reality which begins, more often than not, in a medical not a legal
setting. Tort law must continue to find remedies for the victims of
medical malpractice as it must continue to be the source of justice
and recovery for all who sustain harm because of civil wrongs. Perhaps the single greatest impression received from reviewing the
case law advance sheets each year in preparing this Article is the
continued vitality and relevance of our common law system and,
aberrant, poorly reasoned and silly decisions aside, the degree of
wisdom expressed by our very busy jurists each year.
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132 Misc. 2d 555, 504 N.Y.S.2d 379 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1986).
N.Y.S.2d at 379.
N.Y.S.2d at 379.
N.Y.S.2d at 379.
N.Y.S.2d at 382.
Id. at 560-61, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
See id. at 556, 504
See id. at 555, 504
See id. at 556, 504
See id. at 561, 504
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